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Abstract 
In the aftermath of the Second World War and the many expressions of Fascist ideology 
that arose during this time period, many European philosophers explored the relationship 
between psychology, emotions, and politics. In analyzing Fascism, philosophers such as Erich 
Fromm, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and Michel Foucault, focused on the social nature of 
psychology, and they also went a step further in connecting this analysis to the psychological 
“costs” of capitalism, up to and including Fascism. The threat of Fascism remains a 
contemporary concern, but a problem that arises in applying their critiques and understandings to 
psychology and politics today are new technologies, and the dominance of the bio-medical 
model of mental health. To understand the relevance of these authors today, this thesis first uses 
an epistemological approach to locate the bio-medical model as a theory of knowledge, and 
secondly, a historical approach is used to consider the common concern of Fascism that 
motivated these philosophers to delve into the connections between psychology and Fascism. By 
threading these distinct approaches and motivations together, this thesis moves beyond simply an 
epistemological critique of positivism, but instead suggests that by framing mental health in this 
model we also discount the role of emotions in politics—which is even more crucial to 
understand in times of political-economic instability. As many places in Europe and North 
America see either a resurgence or reinvention of Fascist ideology and organizations, the causes 
and consequences of epidemic mental illness (panic, depression, anxiety, and addiction), become 
ever more necessary to examine, along with what makes a “sane society.” 
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Introduction 
In the aftermath of the Second World War and the many expressions of Fascist ideology 
that arose during this time period, many European philosophers explored the relationship 
between psychology, emotions, and politics, in the service of understanding how such 
supposedly “civilized” nations could perpetuate barbarous and genocidal actions against each 
other. Fascism broke the illusion of continual progress that had defined the imagined trajectory 
of many of these countries and “its atmosphere [was] one of brutal violence and psychic shocks” 
(Suvin, 2017, 261). In analyzing this phenomenon, many political theorists and philosophers 
found it necessary to delve into psychological explanations to account for the rise of Fascism, 
some examples being crowd psychology and the attraction to “strong man” leaders. While 
philosophers such as Erich Fromm, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and Michel Foucault, focused 
on the social nature of psychology, and they also went a step further in connecting this analysis 
to the psychological “costs” of capitalism, up to and including Fascism. For Fromm, who came 
from a psychoanalytic and Marxist tradition, Fascism was connected to the death drive, and the 
subsequent denial or denigration of life, but was also related to a class-based “social character.” 
In Foucault's works Fascism had its origins in bio-politics and ideas from psychiatric history 
such as eugenics and degeneration theory, which justified state racism and extreme violence in 
order to maintain a certain “social body.” In Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy Fascism was the 
result of the “fascist in all of us,” or socially produced Fascist desire, and the everyday 
corrupting influences of hierarchy, domination, and power. Fromm, Foucault, and Deleuze and 
Guattari have different criticisms, purposes, and scopes in their work, but they all share a 
common purpose in taking psychology out of the realm of individual and biological disorder, to a 
social and cultural phenomenon, which is informed by a broader critique of capitalism, or at the 
very least structures of power. 
While an issue such as the threat of Fascism remains a contemporary concern, the main 
problem that arises in applying these critiques and understandings to psychology and politics 
today are new technologies, which facilitate a data-driven, bio-medical model of mental illness, 
making even standard human emotions as subject to quantification. To understand the relevance 
of these authors today, first an epistemological approach will be used to locate the bio-medical 
model as a theory of knowledge, and secondly, a historical approach will be used to consider the 
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common concern of Fascism that motivated these philosophers to delve into the connections 
between emotions, psychology, and politics. As many places in Europe and North America see 
either a resurgence or reinvention of Fascist ideology and organizations, the causes and 
consequences of epidemic mental illness (panic, depression, anxiety, and addiction), become 
ever more necessary to examine, along with what makes a “sane society.” 
This thesis is set up to explore the commonalities in the critiques of these authors that led 
them to connect the seemingly disparate realms of psychology and Fascism, as well as what 
these writings can offer today in the context of both a growing mental health crisis and the 
resurgence of Fascist ideologies and organizations. A brief discussion on the mental health crisis 
in Canada and a few recent epidemiological studies demonstrates the empirical reality and scope 
of this problem. Looking into the development of psychology reveals insight into how and why 
the positivist approach to knowledge coincided with psychology being cemented as a discipline. 
The debate on Fascism will briefly be explored in order to provide greater conceptual clarity 
between what can be called “Historical Fascism” and theorizing Fascist ideology today. The 
overview and analysis of Fromm, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari takes place on an 
epistemological level to illuminate their critiques of psychology and psychiatry, and a second 
historical approach contextualizes these authors and their understandings of Fascism. The 
comparative analysis in this thesis shows that the main tension in these works is between the 
necessity of affirming or critiquing Humanism on one level and the concern with programmatic 
or political applications of their work on the other. On the historical side of the comparative 
analysis, all the works under study are in alignment with the position that Fascist ideology and 
organization is part of a social subjectivity, but how this subjectivity and psychology develops 
differs. In applying these critiques to a contemporary context, a later essay by Deleuze and the 
recent work of Byung-Chul Han will give some insight into how these theoretical threads have 
been reinvented to respond to the changing economic and institutional realities of neoliberal and 
financial capitalism, but this section on new developments will also offer a critique to Han's 
work in problematizing his idea of “self-exploitation” and the “achievement-subject.” In finally 
returning to the problem of the resurgence of Fascist ideology and movements, the conclusions 
drawn from this work point to the necessity in taking emotions seriously in the development of 
an alternative future or more “sane society.”  
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Fromm has a large body of work, but both Escape from Freedom (1941) and The Sane 
Society (1955) are two key texts for the purposes of this thesis. Both of these major works as 
well as several essays from Fromm attempted to account for the rise of Fascism in many 
supposedly free and democratic European nations. Fromm wrote about Fascism from both a 
psychoanalytic and Marxist perspective. In looking at both the affects of alienation and the death 
drive, Fromm claimed in his essay “Prophets and Priests,” that; “there is indeed no greater 
distinction among human beings than that between those who love life and those who love 
death” (1967, 56). The Sane Society, one of Fromm's main works on social psychology, 
describes the damaging consequences of consumerism and alienation on the human psyche 
(soul). Fromm attempted to look at the “pathology of normalcy,” meaning that rather than 
defining health through the pathology of those who are labelled as sick, his work suggested that 
the normative values of a society could themselves be “unhealthy.” Fromm used Alienation in a 
specific and Marxist sense, and defined Alienation's primary modes of expression as 
quantification and abstraction, in order to describe how mental distress occurred collectively. For 
Fromm, Alienation separates human beings from their own human nature and potential, which he 
defined in normative and Humanist, rather than sociologically relative terms.  
Like Fromm, Michel Foucault also investigated the concepts of abnormality/normality, 
and psychiatric power, but would define these structures as falling under larger frameworks of 
bio-power. Though coming to the study of Fascism from a different generation, it is evident in 
Foucault's work that he was also concerned with the possible resurgence of Fascism, and what he 
titled “the fascism in all of us,” that causes humans to “desire the very thing that dominates and 
exploits us” (1977, xiii). Foucault's earliest work Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity 
in the Age of Reason (1961, Eng. 1965) is a key text in critical perspectives on psychiatry and 
medicine that studied historical and subversive conceptions of Madness in Europe. The text 
connected the rise of institutionalization to the “Great Confinement” of Europe, in which poor 
laws criminalized poverty and based membership in society on the ability to work and be 
productive in ways which benefited the transition to capitalism. This aspect of Foucault's work 
shows continuities between the bio-politics of neoliberalism and the extreme bio-politics of 
Nazism/Fascism, where many disabled, and mentally ill people, or just those labelled as “anti-
social” were described as economically bad investments and termed Unnütze Esser (useless 
eaters), or simply Lebensunwertes Lebens (life unworthy of life). Foucault claimed that as 
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Madness disappeared and mental illness became the primary way of diagnosing and 
conceptualizing mental distress, the possibility of dialogue between reason and unreason ended. 
Those defined as less sane, were purveyors of “unreason.” Foucault's Psychiatric Power: 
Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973-1974 and History of Sexuality volume one are also 
necessary to include in this reading of Foucault to get a sense of how his understandings of these 
topics shifted. While these works also focused on the role of institutions, medicine, and 
subjectivity, Foucault did not quite return to his earliest theorizing on the deviance of madness, 
believing that the labels of mental illness eroded any subversive possibility these subjectivities 
previously had. To see Madness as possible would be to admit that there was an “outside,” or a 
marginal space apart from bio-politics and mechanisms of power, and Foucault increasingly 
claimed that “the margin is a myth” (Pelbart, 2000, 204).  
The third theoretical contribution to be studied is the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari. The first book of Capitalism and Schizophrenia titled Anti-Oedipus (1972, Eng. 1977), 
like Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom, also examined Fascism. It did so by looking at how 
desire is a social phenomenon, which can operate repressively, and cause individuals to actively 
desire their own subjugation. Anti-Oedipus was described by Foucault as both a “book of ethics” 
and the “Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life” (1972, xiii). The second volume of Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia titled A Thousand Plateaus (1980, Eng. 1981) explains ideas of multiplicity 
which are relevant to their understanding of the psyche and expands on related concepts like the 
Body without Organs. Through their study of psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari critiqued 
how the Freudian theory of the Oedipal complex centered so much of human psychology around 
the role of the nuclear family and its reproduction. Deleuze and Guattari defined their work as a 
“materialist psychiatry,” and claimed that there is no psychic reality which exists apart from the 
social production of reality, or that emotions and desires do not exist independently of economic 
or social life. As with the work of both Fromm and Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari questioned 
the neutrality and objectivity of positivist epistemology, writing that “scientific knowledge as 
nonbelief is truly the last refuge of belief” (1977, 111). Prior to the 1980s, psychoanalytic theory 
and the “talking cure” were the main methods of identifying and coping with mental disorder in 
patients. However, drugs and pharmaceuticals were in use long before “Big Pharma” was 
identified as a growing problem in the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorder. While many 
of Deleuze and Guattari's social and political critiques continue to be relevant, the disappearance 
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of psychoanalysis and dominance of the bio-medical model means that their critiques of 
positivism in psychology will have more application today.  
 
 
The New “Normal,” or a Mental Health Crisis?  
In turning now to a brief outline of the scale of the problems in mental health, in Canada 
it is suggested that 1/5 Canadians a year experience a mental health or addiction problem, and 
that by the age of 40, 1 in 2 have or have had a mental illness (CAMH, 2018). The way these 
disorders are diagnosed and expressed is gendered, with men having higher rates of addiction 
and women having higher rates of mood and anxiety disorders. Given the high rates of these 
statistics, it is not surprising that mental illness is classified as the leading cause of disability in 
Canada. The rate of addiction in Canada (which should also be considered around discussions of 
mental health) suggests that 21.6% of people meet the criteria for a substance disorder in their 
lifetime (Statistics Canada, 2012). For one example on the front of health and addiction, Canada 
is the 2nd highest consumer of opiods per-capita in the world, and in 2017 alone around 4,000 
people died from fentanyl/opiod-related deaths in Canada, making this one issue alone a serious 
national health crisis (Canadian Press, 2017). There is also a noted overlap or “comorbidity” 
between mental health problems and addiction, as those diagnosed with a mental illness are also 
twice as likely to have a substance use or addiction problem.  
In examining statistics for suicide in Canada it is estimated that 4,000 people a year 
commit suicide, or 11 people a day (CMHA, 2018). Canada has some of the highest suicide rates 
in the world when looking at Inuit youth, who take their lives at a rate that is 11x the national 
average (CFMS, 2017). Overall Indigenous youth in Canada are 5-6x more likely to die by 
suicide than non-Indigenous youth (CFMS, 2017). Populations in Canada that experience high 
rates of mental illness also include the homeless and those who are incarcerated. In the U.K., 
data from the NHS shows that rates of mental illness are rising among girls and young women, 
and that 3/4 of all anti-depressants are being prescribed to girls between the ages of 13-17 
(Sacks-Jones, 2017). This is a non-exhaustive, but current list of statistics which helps frame the 
scale of these issues and already suggests there is a clear link between mental health outcomes 
and the experience of violence.  
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That mental health outcomes are also connected to class and that economic disturbances 
correlate with an increase in mental illness or disorder has been well documented. An economic 
depression therefore can more literally denote depression. Low income Canadians are 3-4 times 
more likely to report poor to fair mental health than those in the highest income (CAMH). This is 
also not a Canadian phenomenon; international epidemiological studies, such as one done by 
Roger Wilkinson and Kate Pickett suggested that societies with less income inequality had lower 
rates of mental illness. According to Wilkinson and Pickett and their study of mental disorders in 
the United States, “if over the next 50 years the extremely unequal U.S.A. were to change its 
income distribution to that of more equal Japan or Spain, the rate of mental disorders would drop 
by half” (Wright, 2014). A recent epidemiological study of Greece shows that between the years 
2010-2012 the suicide rate rose by 35%, especially between those of working age, suggesting a 
clear correlation between the imposition of economic austerity and mental health outcomes 
(Rachiotis et al, 2015). From the perspective of these studies, by de-contextualizing common 
mental illnesses like depression or anxiety or making these into strictly an individual-biological 
problem, social and political problems like lack of support, community, and the destructive 
consequences of economic policies like austerity do not get assigned the responsibility they 
deserve for causing such widespread social suffering.  
When mental health statistics and the severity of the mental illness epidemic are reported 
on or discussed in relation to the economy, they are instead often linked to an economic “cost” or 
burden to the society and healthcare system as a whole. In Canada, mental illness is framed as 
“costing” the country at least 50 billion dollars in GDP a year (Picard, 2013). This cost-benefit 
analysis goes so far as to economize depression and anxiety to calculate how much they impact 
the GDP. The Conference Board of Canada suggests we can deduce that depression causes 
Canada to lose 32.3 billion dollars in GDP every year, while anxiety causes Canadians to lose 
17.3 billion dollars in GDP per year (Mortillaro, 2016). The state of the healthcare system itself 
is one issue, but the loss of work hours, motivation, and productivity that a deep depression may 
bring on is portrayed as an even more pressing societal concern. This narrative suggests that 
addressing mental illness will allow the economy to run more smoothly, and the GDP will 
increase, ignoring the reality that these mental illnesses occurred in an economic framework 
which remains unaltered, or that they may have a social function within that system.  
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The idea that normative judgements and morals are implicit in the practice of psychology 
and psychiatry is not new. According to Ronald B. Miller, “by reducing moral views to simple 
biases and prejudices, scientific psychology is able to easily dismiss the relevance of moral 
issues to psychological investigation” (2004, 24). In Miller’s view, psychology as a discipline 
evolved out of philosophy, yet clinical and abnormal psychology today offers no conceptual 
engagement with the concept of suffering. The lack of philosophical engagement with concepts 
like suffering points to the necessity of maintaining the claim of moral and political neutrality 
under which the bio-medical model and other scientific paradigms operate. Despite the 
overwhelming adaptation of the bio-medical model, in looking at the history of psychology as a 
discipline, it was not inevitable or necessarily evident that a fully positivist framework would be 
adapted.  
The Discipline of Psychology 
The main model of mental disorder today is defined by “bio-medicalization,” or a focus 
on biological and physiological measures to identify symptoms, make a diagnosis, and prescribe 
treatments, such as a focus on psychotropic medications, brain functioning, and genetic 
explanations of mental illness (Smith, 77, 2014). With the release of the DSM-III and new SSRIs 
in the 1980s, “the dominant perspective in psychiatry shifted to one in which psychiatric troubles 
were considered disorders rooted in brain chemistry and best treated with psychotropic 
medications” (Smith, 77, 2014). Both causal forces and bio-chemical mechanisms and processes 
are key to this model (Miller, 2004, 32). The bio-medical model relies on a positivist 
epistemology, where the medical, social, and psychological aspects of treatment are validated as 
useful, based on forms of knowledge in the natural sciences. The bio-medical model of mental 
illness has been criticized for its ineffectiveness in both treating and preventing an epidemic of 
many types of mental disorders. Andrew Scull writes in Madness and Civilization: A Cultural 
History of Insanity (2015) that those who suffer from psychosis are one of few populations in 
North American society whose life expectancy has seriously declined over the past quarter of a 
century, “one telling measure of the gap between psychiatry's pretension and performance” (14).  
Pathology and illness cannot purely be contained to a biological sphere and also inhabits 
the cultural. In Susan Sontag’s Illness as Metaphor (1978), Sontag analyzes the metaphorical and 
cultural associations of both tuberculosis and cancer, and suggests that these diseases were not 
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only psychologized, but that the way they are understood is affected by the social hierarchy of 
the body. Or that, “while TB takes on the qualities assigned to the lungs, which are part of the 
upper, spiritualized body, cancer is notorious for attacking parts of the body (colon, bladder, 
rectum, breast, cervix, prostate, testicles) that are embarrassing to acknowledge” (17). 
Tuberculosis was not only associated with Romanticism, but the lungs were etymologically also 
associated with the idea of the spirit (pneuma). While Sontag’s work helps to illuminate that 
other illnesses also carry their own cultural and moral baggage, the hope that illness can be 
liberated from metaphor, or the social and cultural fully separated from the biological also 
implies there is an ideal scientific framework free from normative and moral judgements which 
can be reached. On the question of mental health, where this bio-medical model particularly 
becomes troubling is the lack of engagement with political and economic forces in shaping 
mental health outcomes and also how these mental disorders are defined, and what moral 
judgements are made in their conception.  
Despite the dominance of the bio-medical model today, psychology is also a vast field of 
study which when looking at its history, does not necessarily carry determinants that make it 
inevitable for this model to have been cemented. Psychology developed conceptually by drawing 
from movements as varied as Phenomenology, Romanticism, and Existentialism, and in many 
ways evolved as a discipline out of philosophy (Miller, 2004). Early Existentialists such as 
Kierkegaard dealt with psychological phenomenon and conceptions of freedom in relation to 
Christian theology and the ideas of hereditary sin and the “fall” of man, devoting a whole work 
to the conceptual exploration of anxiety (Kierkegaard, 2014). Romantics such as Keats countered 
Rationalism by defining the concept of negative capability, “when a man is capable of being in 
uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason,” or to 
experience doubt and irrationality, but still find truth through intuition (1817). Branches of 
psychology and psychiatry especially coincided with philosophy through Existential 
Phenomenology and the association and work between clinicians and philosophers such as Jean-
Paul Sartre, Karl Jaspers, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Martin Heidegger (Ratcliffe & Broome, 
2012, 362). Another interesting example of the overlap between psychiatry and philosophy is the 
work of Ludwig Binswanger whose method of Daseinsanalyse was heavily influenced by 
Heidgger’s Being and Time. Binswanger used Heidegger’s notion of “Being in the World” to 
develop a “science of subjectivity” apart from dualistic interpretations of mind and body (Smyth, 
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2011, 93). Though works of Existential psychology and psychotherapy exist today, the earlier 
antecedents of Existentialism and Romanticism which explored psychology through subjectivity 
and structures of existence over psycho-pathology, would become the excluded countercurrent to 
the growing shape of psychology as a discipline. Enlightenment views on the new Rationalism 
linked emotion to primitive or animalistic instincts, while through Utilitarian theories—even 
morality could be portrayed as a naturalistic and scientific phenomenon (Miller, 2004, 81). 
 The androcentric nature of these theories of emotion and subjectivity is a key point that 
has also been outlined many times since Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex which 
demonstrated how the feminine is defined as Other in relation to a universalistic notion of an 
androcentric subjectivity (2011). One of the most infamous and gendered moments in the history 
of psychiatry was hysteria, where women were classified as ill due to the “mutable” quality of 
their bodies, as hysteria comes from the Greek hystera, or uterus, and denoted the negative 
consequences of a ‘wandering womb.’ With the etymological meaning of psychology being the 
study of the soul or spirit, it seems strange psychology even came to be justified on a purely 
scientific basis. As psychology became institutionalized as a discipline in the late 1800s it 
increasingly severed the connections between philosophical concepts such as psyche from 
psychology and made few attempts to account for the role of emotions in human behaviour 
(Miller, 32, 2004).  
By the end of the 19th Century, psychiatry had fully attained the status of a discipline 
through its integration into others branches of medicine, the rise in clinics, and the 
professionalization of the field through the establishment of research chairs, journals, societies, 
textbooks, and conferences. Though positivism was the ideal model guiding social-based 
planning in psychiatric and psychological studies, many of the popular theories of the time 
amounted to a pseudo-scientific racism which had major impacts on racial hygiene policies and 
eugenics in the 20th Century. Hereditary patterns of mental illness were connected to the theory 
of degeneration or “degenerationism” in countries such as France and Great Britain. 
Degeneration theorists targeted populations who were not seen as productive workers or citizens 
and suggested that madness was genetic and would accumulate, becoming worse through 
successive generations. Pedlar writes that although “the idea of degeneration was originally a 
biological concept, it adapted easily to more figurative usage, providing a scientific foundation 
for the moral panic at the end of the century” (2006, 134). Max Nordau’s 1892 work 
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Degeneration called psychiatrists to action and targeted public figures like Oscar Wilde as 
proponents of the “degeneration” of society. Nordau wrote that degenerates occupy a 
“borderland between reason and pronounced madness” and “lack a sense of morality and right 
and wrong” (Pedlar, 2006, 134). In the fin de siècle period there was a sense that a type of 
atavism had taken hold of society, and degeneration theory was used to explain and medicalize 
“the increasingly unpredictable behaviour of radical individuals and the anonymous masses 
swelling in the streets of evergrowing cities” (Pietikainen, 2015, 126).  Foucault defined this 
preoccupation with degeneration and decline as a kind of “pornography of the morbid” (1980, 
53). A work that famously encapsulates these fears is Bram Stoker's Dracula, published in 1897. 
In Stoker’s Dracula the mad character of Renfield acts as both the object of Dr. Seward's 
medical studies and the intermediary between the monstrous figure of Dracula and the human 
world (2000). The mad Renfield is the servant of and the closest human to Dracula, while the 
main advantage the “crew of light” had at their disposal to neutralize both Renfield and Dracula 
is described by Dr. Van Helsing when he claims that, “we have on our side…a power denied to 
the vampire kind; we have resources of science” (2000, 279).  
While the theory of degeneration lost credibility in the early 20th Century, its influence 
could still be seen in eugenics, and genetic conceptualizations of psychological disorders. The 
beginning of eugenics is primarily associated with Francis Galton, a cousin of Darwin who used 
a combination of statistics, evolutionary theory, and genealogy to suggest that “inferior” families 
should not be allowed to reproduce, as they were more likely to produce degenerate individuals. 
The more “hard heredity” idea that reproduction should be contained to the 'best' or 'good stock' 
of society gained ground in North America, Nordic countries, as well as many German-speaking 
parts of Europe. According to Petteri Pietikainen and his study of Madness, rather than viewing 
eugenics as an abberation in the history of liberal democracy, “eugenics was an intrinsic part of 
modernization especially in the Western hemisphere” (2015, 131). While eugenics is a broad 
topic of discussion that goes beyond this work, it is key to mention briefly in any study looking 
at the concurrents of psychology and Fascism, for both the extreme impact degeneration theory 
and eugenics had, and for the way it will resurface in studying these philosophers, particularly 
Foucault.  
The most violent consequences of eugenic policies took place during the Second World 
War and the Holocaust. Eugenics were already a part of German health policy during the 
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Weimar Republic (1919-1933), but under the Nazi regime in 1933 the Sterilization Law in 
Germany set up a 'Genetic Health Court,' which ordered the forced sterilization of any patients 
deemed to have genetic disorders or deficiencies that could be passed on through reproduction. It 
is estimated today that approximately 400,000 people were forcefully sterilized through this 
program, and 200,000 people by 1937 alone. The sterilization program led to a euthanasia 
program (Aktion T4) in 1939, where over 70,000 psychiatric patients were killed in under two 
years. Victims of euthanasia were usually more likely to be working class, with less education, 
and without permanent jobs or families. Underlying the large scale of people sterilized and killed 
is the fact that “from 1933 onwards, the criteria for incarceration in a mental hospital included 
alcoholism, antisocial behaviour, homosexuality, political dissent, prostitution, vagrancy and 
disinclination to work” (Pietikainen, 234). Other major factors such as anti-Communism, anti-
Semitism, and racial theories of supremacy motivated the Nazi regime and the ensuing “War of 
Annihilation” (Vernichtungskrieg). Yet, the scientific validation of theories of degeneration and 
eugenics generated an idea of purity and protection of the social body, while also leaving those 
who were disabled, or labelled as mentally ill dehumanized and vulnerable to further violence. It 
is also an often-repeated statistic that doctors were one of the most over-represented professions 
in the ranks of the Nazi party.  
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Defining Fascism Today 
In situating Fromm, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari historically, and dealing with the 
contemporary rise of Fascism, it is key to explore what Fascism means today. Fascism is a 
contested term and has been used to describe varied political situations, to the point where some 
feel it is simply an inflammatory label put on anything one finds offensive. The more Liberal 
view and theory of Fascism would be the belief in what can be called a definition of “Historical 
Fascism,” or a Fascism that is relevant to a particular set of economic and historical 
circumstances from the time of 1919-1945, especially in Germany, Spain, and Italy. Another 
matter which complicates an appropriate contemporary definition is the use of the term 
“Totalitarianism.” In a North American context, the use of “Totalitarianism” often equates the 
Fascist with the Stalinist experience, despite the contrast and conflict in these ideologies and also 
often confuses Stalinism with all communist or Marxist movements. As will be seen in the 
discussion of Fromm, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari, Fascism has never been a static 
concept or phenomena. When considering the connection with psychology and how psychic 
forces are connected to economic conditions, Fascism is also not something that can be seen as 
“external” to the society under study, but also relates to social subjectivity and desire as a social 
force—though there may be disagreement in how these psychological forces are produced. 
Explanations of contemporary Fascism must be updated to express current societal and economic 
realities, but the fact that Fascism has never been truly eliminated also indicates that the 
historical definition and liberal view Fascism does not hold up and a deeper study needs to be 
taken to explain its ongoing resonance. 
In Darko Suvin’s essay “To Explain Fascism Today,” he suggests that Fascism was not a 
deviation from capitalism, but a structural possibility and trend or result of it. While Suvin 
acknowledges that Fascism in different countries had varied cultural contexts (ex. the role of the 
Catholic church), he claims that Fascism does have deeper historical roots and generalizations 
can be made to determine and identify the preconditions for a Fascist movement or ideology. The 
key factors in Fascism are the activation of threatened middle classes with the support of a 
dictatorial ‘totalising’ organization, and the ideology of national superiority or blood (2017, 
263). The socio-political thrust of Fascism historically lied in the pretence of uniting a whole 
nation while practically forging a class block between the rulers and tired sectors of the middle 
classes and neutralizing the working class and deviant political forces by terror and ideology. 
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While the more reductive Marxist perspective viewed Historical Fascism as simply another stage 
in monopoly capitalism, Suvin claims that an economic-psychological crisis is necessary for 
Fascism to develop, and in this sense, Fascism develops out of the decay of Liberal institutions 
and the failure of offering up political alternatives. Fascism is a “unique combination of the 
worst traits from all class societies; slavery for the ‘biologically inferior,’ feudal rule by the small 
local barons even over specific activities, and capitalist exploitation stripped of democratic 
curbs—a new historical monstrosity” (2017, 271). In Suvin’s view the main factors today which 
are influencing the growth of contemporary Fascism come from both a rise in militarization and 
violence, which have the consequences of both hollowing out the concept of citizenship and 
seeing war as the “father of all things” (2017, 276). 
A key discussion which expands on the role of citizenship in a contemporary theory of 
Fascism comes from the Hungarian philosopher G.M. Tamás who has developed the theory of a 
“post-fascism.” Post-fascism “reverses the Enlightenment tendency to assimilate citizenship to 
the human condition,” or merge the highest level of humanity with citizenship (2000). “Post-
fascism,” despite the name, does not mean Fascism is no longer a threat, but that it exists within 
different structures and without formal or military dictatorship. For Tamás, “post-totalitarian 
Fascism is thriving under the capacious carapace of global capitalism” (2000). Under historical 
Fascism in Germany, Jewish people were targeted for mass murder, but other targeted groups 
included the Roma, Communists, Gay men and LGBTQ people, and the mentally ill, who were 
all classified as non-citizen and therefore as non-human in the eyes of the state. On a more 
extreme scale in comparison to how there continues to be antagonism around policies such as 
affirmative action or diversity initiatives to address historical oppression, for Tamás, these 
categories of people were seen by the Fascists as part of the Enlightenment project of inclusion 
and the expansion of the rights of citizenship. While the marker of narrowing ideals of 
citizenship alone is not a complete theory of Fascism, racism and the delineation between citizen 
and non-citizen seems to have remained one of the most striking characteristics of Fascist 
thought, while the hollowing out of the concept of citizenship also relates to the decay or crisis of 
Liberal institutions. In Tamás' essay “On Post-Fascism: How Citizenship is Becoming an 
Exclusive Privilege,” he recounts that the classification of citizen vs. non-citizen is not a Fascist 
invention, but that “Fascism, having put an end to the bourgeois realization of Enlightenment 
(i.e., to egalitarian capitalist democracy), transforms the social exclusion of the unproductive 
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(from hermits and vatic poets to unemployable paupers and indomitable rebels) into their natural 
exclusion (i.e., extra-legal arrests, hunger, and death)” (2000).  
The increasing restrictions on and privileging of citizenship is not hard to see either in a 
European or North American context. The high levels of deportations, and detention of 
immigrants in the United States, the desire to ban travel of people from predominantly Muslim 
countries, the plan to 'build a wall' between Mexico and the United States, and the rise of White 
Nationalist and Neo-Nazi groups (the so-called “Alt-right”), all point to both the narrowing of 
citizenship and the increasing normalization of racist diatribes in mainstream culture. While 
there is often the temptation to juxtapose Canada as more enlightened and liberal compared to 
the United States, rising racism is also an issue in Canada, not only because of the settler-
colonial context, but also given the increase in Islamophobia and terrorist attacks like the Quebec 
City mosque shooting, motivated by “far-right” views. In Europe these issues are evident in both 
the militarization of borders to prevent immigration from refugees fleeing war in countries such 
as Syria and Libya, and the rise of Fascist parties and extremely xenophobic groups.  
These parties are present in countries such as; Germany, Austria, Hungary, Croatia, 
Poland, France, Italy, Greece, and the Czech Republic, but other European countries such as 
Spain, also face the resurrection of Fascist ideas through the rise of revisionist history. In Austria 
the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) is the governing party, while in Germany the 
Alternative for Germany (AfD), is the third largest party in the Bundestag and currently is 
polling as the second most popular party in the country (Deutsche Welle, 2018). In Poland, the 
annual Independence march on November 11th, 2017, saw 60,000 on the streets with slogans 
seen such as “Clean Blood,” and “Europe Will be White” (Wilczewska, 2017). Despite the fact 
that North America (particularly the United States), does not have the historical experience of 
Fascism, the sense of decline, revanchism, and the need to resurrect a national identity based 
primarily on ethnic lines are clear connecting themes and sentiments. Likewise, even though 
there is no great counterforce or threat in a communist or anti-capitalist alternative movement 
winning power throughout Europe, Fascist and xenophobic parties have coalesced and won 
support. Given the gap between historical Fascism and the present circumstances, the most 
important question is not about historical experience and patterns, but the importance of internal 
and psychic factors, as well as what is eternally violent in these societies which causes the 
Fascist ideology to continually resurface. 
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 “To be sensuous, that is, to be really existing, means to be an object of sense, to be a sensuous object, to 
have sensuous objects outside oneself – objects of one’s sensuousness. To be sensuous is to suffer. Man 
as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being – and because he feels that he suffers, 
a passionate being.” 
(Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844) 
Analysis of Authors 
To Keep the Soul in Psyche: A Marxist Humanist Approach 
In exploring the work of Erich Fromm, first, an epistemological approach will be used to 
expand on the three main themes in this area of Fromm's work; his critique of Freud and place 
within psychoanalysis, the conceptual use of Alienation, and his conceptualization of the proper 
role and task of social psychology. The second historical approach will be applied to both 
contextualize Fromm as a philosopher responding to and motivated by the destruction Fascism 
brought to Europe and to examine his understandings of Fascism. Fromm's articulation of a 
critical psychology suggests that the most commonly accepted understanding of health is based 
on social necessity rather than a more intrinsic definition of health that focuses on human 
development or the flourishing of human nature. Fromm's views on Fascism are related to the 
development of what he calls the “authoritarian personality” and focuses on the psychological 
impact of conceptions of power, but alongside this, he also forms a study of a class-based “social 
character” which was more likely to support Fascism. The link between psychological study and 
Fascism in Fromm is evident in the way he discusses psychic forces and connects the rise in 
Fascism to the social character of a class which needed new identifications.  
In many ways, Fromm's works fall into the tradition of philosophers trying to harmonize 
the writings of what is often called a “young” Karl Marx with the psychoanalysis of Sigmund 
Freud. In his 1962 work Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud 
Fromm writes that both Marx and Freud operate under the same assumption “that man lives with 
illusion because these illusions make the misery of real life bearable” (15). Freud is considered 
by Fromm to be a radical, but unlike Marx not a revolutionary thinker, while Fromm thinks 
Freud's greatest achievement was the discovery of the unconscious and “science of the irrational” 
(1970b, 6). Despite this contribution, Fromm also considers Freud to be “deeply rooted in the 
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prejudices and philosophy of his historical period and class” (1970b, 6). Freudian psychoanalysis 
was critical of existing psychiatric ideas and attacked the values of the Victorian age, especially 
“the notion that sex was not a subject for rational scientific investigation” (1962, 135). Freud 
may have examined the insincerity of Victorian morality, and the notion that there was no 
psychic and transcending consciousness, but his theories did not disrupt the existing social order. 
Freud was strongly representative of the urban middle class or bourgeois, and “tended to 
consider as neurotic anyone who deviated from this attitude, either to the left or to the right” 
(1962, 136).  
One clear example of considering anyone “neurotic” who deviated from bourgeois norms 
was Freud's analysis of hysteria. Freud famously studied hysteria with Jean-Martin Charcot in 
Paris during the winter of 1885-1886 and came to the conclusion that hysteria was rooted in the 
original suppression of traumatic memories with sexual content. Freud linked hysteria to a 
“seduction” in early childhood and suggested to his colleague Fleiss that for hysterics, “in all 
cases, the father, not excluding my own, had to be accused of being perverse” (2013, xxiv). 
Hysteria then was linked to the violence of patriarchally organized families. Rather than using 
his findings to critique a culture which accepts violence or abuse within and outside the family, 
psychoanalysts like Freud used the ideological concept of the nuclear family to explain the roots 
of desire and formation for many types of psychiatric disorders, including hysteria. This was a 
problem in Fromm's eyes not only because of the evident misogyny in Freud's work, but also 
because Fromm then concluded that the aim of the Freudian “talking cure” was simply to help 
individuals adjust uncritically to circumstance, or to “reality,” which Fromm called “a state of 
mind in which one's individual unhappiness is reduced to the level of the general unhappiness,” 
with the aim of “adjustment” (1962, 139). While Fromm drops many of the prejudices and 
uncritical aims of psychoanalysis, what he takes from Freud to add to his Marxist analysis is the 
understanding that “social neurosis,” is possible, not just individual pathology, and that psychic 
forces have both a historical and social content. 
Since psychic forces are historical, they are also subject to change overtime and are not 
fixed. According to Fromm, “psychoanalysis is, first of all, a dynamic psychology,” so to speak 
of psychic forces is to speak of social forces (1981b, 25). For a legitimate psychology to develop 
in Fromm's view it must be a social psychology, since psychic forces are collective. In Fromm's 
work, social psychology is also defined as a critical psychology, or “one critical of man's 
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consciousness” (1981b, 26). This critical psychology understands that “the social character is 
that particular structure of psychic energy which is molded by any given society so as to be 
useful for the functioning of that particular society” (1981b, 27). The social character of a society 
is not an inevitability, but the result of particular historical processes. The human psyche is 
molded for its use as productive force in the social process. Fromm uses the social character as 
the link between the material base and ideological superstructure in Marxism, to explain how 
people may act against their own interests and selves in order to protect the social order. In other 
words, “the social character is the intermediary between the socioeconomic structure and the 
ideas and ideals prevalent in a society” (1981b, 30). In The Sane Society (1955) Fromm points to 
the irony in isolating individual patients from their context, remarking that; “we look at them as 
strictly individual incidents, perhaps with some amazement that so many of these incidents 
should occur in a culture which is supposedly so sane” (1967, 13).  
In the way that psychic forces can be seen to be both social and historical, as well as 
mediate between the base and superstructure, Fromm claims we can differentiate between 
individual and social pathology. The difference between individual and social pathology is 
demonstrated through the terms “defect” and “neurosis.” In The Sane Society Fromm proposes 
that a person who fails to gain freedom, spontaneity, and a genuine expression of self might be 
considered to have a severe defect. However, if these goals were not achieved by the majority of 
society, it would be considered a social or socially patterned defect. The individual shares these 
defects with many others and is not even aware of it, and the culture provides patterns to “live 
with defect without becoming ill” (1967, 24). This “pathology of normalcy,” normalizes a 
materialism that leaves people with “intense boredom,” since “man lives not by bread alone” 
(1967, 19). Fromm believes a society itself can be sick and that mental health can only be present 
when there is a satisfactory answer to the question of human existence. That consumerist or 
materialist values are prioritized by a society and seen as a social good does not make them sane, 
as “consensual validation as such has no bearing whatsoever on reason or mental health” (1967, 
23). Ultimately, the social definition of health is an ideologically loaded concept and when 
“speaking of health in a sick society, one uses the concept of health in a sociological sense, as 
denoting adaptation to society” (1970b, 25). Social psychology in Fromm's work must be both 
critical and Humanist or built on some sense of objective human needs and a theory of human 
nature.  
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As a Socialist, Fromm used the term Alienation in a specifically Marxist sense, but from 
the perspective of a psychologist and psychoanalyst he believed that alienation constituted a kind 
of psychopathology and that “Alienation then, is, for Marx, the sickness of man” (1962, 48). 
While there is not necessarily a systematic psychological theory informing Marx's work, for 
Fromm, terms such as “the essence of man,” “alienation,” “consciousness,” and “passionate 
strivings,” were all examples of psychological concepts at work in Marx (1981b, 25). Fromm 
demonstrates that the etymology of alienation comes from an older meaning denoting insanity or 
madness (French: aliéné, Spanish: alienado), and an alienist in English referred to a doctor or 
early psychiatrist who cared for the mad or insane. Under the alienation of capitalism the 
economic and moral sphere are independent from each other and this creates the “core of the 
psychopathology of modern man” (1962, 53). In Fromm's understanding, the model of “Homo 
Consumens” emerges where the main goal in life is not even primarily to own, but to consume. 
Fromm sees this environment as counter to human nature, but he views human adaption to this as 
proof that “one can do almost anything to man, yet only almost” (1981b, 31).  
Consciously, humans living as consumers may be happy with their lot in life, but “the 
more crippled society makes man, the sicker he becomes” (1981b, 30). In order to raise 
consumption, “new artificial needs are created and man's tastes are manipulated” (1981b, 32). 
With consumption as the dominant psychic force, psycho-pathological phenomenon such as 
overeating and buying, and other forms of addictive behaviour compensate for hidden depression 
and anxiety. Similarly, radical post-68 works like Turn Illness Into a Weapon by the Socialist 
Patient's Collective, went further to suggest health itself is as an ideological concept which 
centres primarily around the ability of an individual to work and participate in the labour force, 
“to be healthy, therefore, means to be exploitable” (1972, 6). The Existentialist philosopher Jean-
Paul Sartre's introduction to their polemic connects increasingly high rates of mental illness in 
industrialized capitalist nations to Engel's assertion in The Conditions of the Working Class in 
England (1845), that a world was created “in which only a race of people can feel at home who 
are dehumanized, degraded, intellectually and morally debased to the level of animals, and 
physically morbid” (1972). This alienation and the hidden psychological “costs” of capitalism 
are what Fromm means when he claims anything can be done to man “yet only almost.” 
Like Marx saw the undoing of capitalism inherent in the contradictions of the capitalist 
system itself, Fromm saw this more explicitly in human nature. Fromm writes that, “despots and 
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ruling cliques can succeed in dominating and exploiting their fellow man, but they cannot 
prevent reaction to this inhuman treatment” (1967, 26). Reaction could come about either in a 
creative response in working to bring about change, or a destructive response with the subjects of 
the system simply perishing, giving up, and dying off. Either of these outcomes would lead 
people to be unable to perform the functions necessary to serve the rulers of this system and 
maintain the status quo. Disobedience is for Fromm a virtue of human nature. When forced to 
live under circumstances contrary to human nature, which Fromm defines as adequate conditions 
which provide room for human growth and sanity, either this destructive or creative and 
productive disobedience will occur. Fromm believes that Marxism aligns with these Humanist 
ideals, and “its aim is the full unfolding of man's potentialities—not man as deduced from his 
ideas or consciousness, but man with his physical and psychic properties, the real man who does 
not live in a vacuum but in a social context, the man who has to produce in order to live” (1981b, 
24). In this Marxist Humanist approach, value is in being or what one is, rather than what one 
has.  
Fromm also believed that domination (capitalist or otherwise) could be enforced by 
threats of isolation. Both individually and socially “man's greatest fear is that of complete 
isolation from his fellow man, or complete ostracism” (1981b, 37). In his work On Disobedience 
Fromm claims that society's demands for repression are accomplished by the threat of the primal 
fear of ostracism. The more human a society, or complementary it is to human nature, the less 
need there is to choose between either isolation from society or isolation from humanity. 
Societies contain a given number of irrationalities that “result in the necessity for its members to 
repress the awareness of many of their own feelings and observations” (1962, 123). The 
necessity for repression becomes intense in unrepresentative societies, while the greater the 
conflict between human and social aims, “the more is the individual torn between the two 
dangerous poles of isolation” (1962, 127). That repression increases in more stratified societies, 
suggests that a certain degree of knowledge has to be repressed in order for the individual to 
accept their reality. Tolerating the pull of these two forces is accomplished by both intellectual 
and spiritual development, as one feels solidarity with humanity, they can more easily tolerate 
the threat of ostracism and vice versa. As seen in Fromm's view of human nature, there is 
something more primordial to his understanding of humanity that demarcates how he is able to 
separate the individual from the social. The ability of an individual to act on their own 
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conscience depends on transcending the limits of one's society, and embracing the idea of the 
self as a citizen of the world. Society is not necessarily representative of human nature, rather 
“the unconscious is the whole man—minus that part of him which corresponds to his society” 
(1962, 128). Therefore, in Fromm’s view, society’s definition of health is intrinsically tied to the 
reproduction of that society, not what is healthy by the standards of human nature. The extreme 
repression of feelings and observations increases in more unrepresentative society since the need 
to repress human nature also increases.  
Fromm's Escape from Freedom first published in 1941 is his main work that investigates 
Fascism. While Fromm shares aspects of the Marxist analysis that Fascism developed with 
economic crisis and in response to the growing Socialist or Communist movements, he also 
believes there is a psychological or social character that enables Fascistic violence. Escape from 
Freedom mainly analyzes Nazism, or the German development of Fascism from a social 
psychological standpoint. The key characteristic of the Fascist psychology for Fromm is the 
relationship that develops with power. As will be discussed, Fromm connects these conceptions 
of power to the rise of individualism and individual attempts to bridge the gap between the self 
and the world. The authoritarian character as the “personality structure” of Fascism is for 
Fromm, characterized by either sadist or masochistic strivings and the stark view of a world 
divided into the powerful and the powerless. Finally, in his role as a psychoanalyst, Fromm picks 
up on the near compulsive destruction and cult-like obsession with death that Fascist ideologies 
share and relates this to the common element of misogyny that usually accompanies them.  
To begin to outline Fromm's analysis of Fascism, it is key to start with the tension that 
Fromm identifies with the emergence of individualism under the new structures of liberal 
democracy and capitalism. For Fromm, the rise of individualism and new priorities placed on 
individual freedom saw many attempting to bridge the gap that arose between the self and the 
world. This amounted to seeking out new secondary bonds to make up for the loss of prior 
primary social bonds. This could lead the anxious individual to surrender their individuality or 
the integrity of the self in a desperation to bridge this gap. When this drive became compulsive, 
Fromm believed the Authoritarian personality developed. The most distinct forms of this 
authoritarian character are found in the interplay of submission and domination or masochist-
sadist strivings. The masochist and sadist personality Fromm describes are socially dependent on 
the existence of the other. The masochistic personality is characterized by feelings of inferiority, 
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powerlessness, passiveness, and individual insignificance, while depending on outside powers to 
give the self definition. Life for the masochistic personality is seen as overwhelming and all 
events and powers are seen to come from outside the self, life 'happens' to them, and in extreme 
cases, masochism could lead to the belittlement of and forcing extreme suffering onto the self. In 
contrast, the sadist personality compulsively aims to make others dependent on them, desires 
absolute power over others, and sees others as instrumental objects. In this instrumentalization, 
the sadist wishes to rule over, exploit, steal from, and use others. In more extreme cases, this 
compulsion wishes to see and make others suffer. Despite this, the sadist depends on the object 
of their abuse and cannot destroy it. Fromm writes that the sadist element of authoritarianism is 
both less conscious and more rationalized in society, despite being more socially harmful.  
The authoritarian character is the personality structure of Fascism, and ultimately the 
most important feature of it is the attitude towards power. In Fromm's understanding, the desire 
for power has been rationalized socially as either the “natural” inclination for security or seen as 
part of the Darwinian survival of the fittest. Theories of an innate human desire for power and 
sadistic tendencies normalize violent behaviour and contribute to theories of “evolutionary 
capitalism,” or the idea that capitalism is the inevitable outcome of a competitive human nature, 
not specific to particular and recent historical processes. For Fromm, “with the rise of Fascism, 
the lust for power and the conviction of its right [had] reached new heights” (1970, 183). While 
in a psychological sense, the desire for power may actually be related to an inability for the 
individual self to stand alone, or true weakness, under Fascist conditions might was confused 
with right and power taken to be strength. For the authoritarian, there are only two sets of people; 
the powerful and the powerless. Power fascinates the authoritarian not for any particular values 
that it represents, but simply because it is power. So, “just as his 'love' is automatically aroused 
by power, so powerless people or institutions automatically arouse his contempt” (1970, 190). 
This contempt is so extreme, that the “very sight of a powerless person makes him want to 
attack, dominate, humiliate him” (1970, 190). The concept of equality does not exist for the 
authoritarian personality, and ultimately there are only the superior and inferior i.e. powerful and 
powerless.  
In defining the authoritarian personality, Fromm aims to describe both the character 
structure to which Nazism appealed, as well as the psychological characteristics of the ideology 
that made it such an effective instrument with regard to the same people. These psychological 
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bases are described as a “human basis” for which Nazism could occur, but not the cause of Nazi 
Fascism. Fromm writes that while one part of the German population accepted Nazism without 
resistance, but also without becoming admirers of Nazi ideology and practice, another part of the 
population became deeply attached to the new ideology and fanatically attached to those who 
proclaimed it. Fromm historicizes the psychic forces at work in this period to understand why 
Nazism mainly appealed to what he calls the “lower middle class strata,” or groups like 
shopkeepers, artisans, and white collar workers. For Fromm, the social character of this group 
was markedly different than both the working class and the nobility and upper classes. The 
influence of Calvinism made asceticism a leading value, emphasizing a merciless god and the 
damnation of part of mankind, while the principle of scarcity operated on both an economic and 
social level. In the Great Depression the middle classes were effected the most and Fromm 
identifies the disappearance of institutions such as the monarchy, the increase in women's rights 
and freedoms, and the new “social prestige” of the working class, as all factors related to the 
eventual authoritarian backlash and need to submerge individual identity back into a larger force.  
Underneath the authoritarian character that Fromm defines there is a more general 
undertone of celebration of destruction and death in Fascist ideology. Fromm connects this 
identification with destruction to alienation suggesting that, “bureaucratic individualism tends to 
transform human beings into things. It tends to replace nature by technical devices, the organic 
by the inorganic” (1981, 56). Fromm discusses the Futurist Manifesto and Fascism in Italy, 
connecting the desire for war, destruction, death, and attachment to machines to misogyny, and 
more archetypically the denigration of “life.” One famous slogan illustrating this point being that 
of the Francoist-era General Millán-Astray, who adopted the slogan “¡viva la muerte!” or “long 
live death.” Fromm describes the love of death in the midst of living as the “ultimate perversion” 
(1981, 57) and claims that “there is indeed no greater distinction among human beings than that 
between those who love life and those who love death” (1981, 56). While there are some caught 
in between affirming life or death— “there are some who are true necrophilias—and they salute 
war and promote it, even though they are mostly not aware of their motivation and rationalize 
their desires as serving life, honour, or freedom” (1981, 57).   
 
 
 
22
  
At Once Personal and Political: How the Margin Became a Myth 
In turning to the works of Michel Foucault, his study on Madness seems to be somewhat 
peripheral to his more popular works, but the idea of normality/abnormality, deviance, and 
alterity are frequently reoccurring themes throughout his life's work, even if not always explicitly 
stated. Breaking with Fromm's reliance on Freud, works such as Madness and Civilization: A 
History of Insanity in the Age of Reason focus on the moral theory that is embedded in the 
categorization of madness, while Foucault also criticizes the operations of psychiatric power as a 
whole in his lectures series Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973-1974. 
For Foucault and his genealogical study of madness throughout European history, there is a 
sense that medicalization and what he describes as the dialogue between reason and unreason has 
entailed an overall closing of the possibilities of what it could mean to be human. Foucault is not 
a philosopher often associated with theorizing Fascism, but his conceptualization of bio-politics 
is partly formulated as a response to analyzing Fascist ideology and how the idea of the social 
body played a large role in the Fascist state's structure in Germany. While it is suggested that 
Foucault eventually abandoned his work on madness because he came to believe that the 
“margin was a myth,” or that there was no conceivable outside to bio-politics, his work in this 
area highlights the epistemological problems that occur when models from the natural sciences 
are purely applied to complex subjectivities and psychological states.  
In Madness and Civilization Foucault tracks the perceptions and uses of madness from 
the Middle Ages to the Classical period and finally, modern times. In the Middle Ages, Foucault 
describes the mad as leading wandering existences, being ritually exiled and expulsed from 
towns and villages, or frequently handed over to boatmen who would take them away from the 
cities. This transitory existence is described as being “the passenger par excellence: that is, the 
prisoner of passage” (1965, 11). Access to church was denied to the mad, but not the use of 
sacraments. In these conceptions of madness there was a sense of “something which refers 
elsewhere, and to other things,” or that madness had a divine significance (1965, 58). Archetypes 
associated with the Middle Ages' understanding of madness were fools, prophets, mystics, and 
lovers. Madness was also associated with the danger of the “passions” and corporeal vices. The 
passions were viewed as the intermediary between the soul and body and the balance of the four 
Hippocratic humours was said to account for both illnesses and character i.e. a melancholic, or 
sanguine person. Near the end of the Middle Ages, madness began to be used as a more general 
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form of criticism and a symbol to express different anxieties. Moving into what Foucault called 
the Classical Age (the 17th and 18th Century), Madness was increasingly correlated with 
animality where “the animal in man no longer has any value in the sign of a Beyond; it has 
become his madness, without relation to anything but itself: his madness in the state of nature” 
(1965, 74).  
Where Foucault begins to explain the economic and political factors influencing modern 
conceptions of madness is in his discussion of the “Great Confinement.” Foucault describes in 
both France and England how the introduction of poor laws and other measures criminalizing 
vagabonds and vagrancy led to new structures being built to house the poor, insane, unemployed, 
and prisoners. These structures grew quickly and in 1697 the first workhouse was built in Bristol, 
England, but by the end of the 18th Century there were 126 workhouses built in the country. 
Houses of correction, hospitals, and workhouses formed a new administrative and semi-juridical 
order. Foucault connects the introduction of these institutions to the imperatives of labour and 
what could also be described in Marxist terminology as “primitive accumulation.” Instead of the 
negative measures of exclusion which used to shun or exile the mad from society, confinement 
increasingly absorbed everyone into the new economic model. The anxiety around Madness was 
no longer in relation to either a reference to the Beyond or to pure animal instincts, but the 
anxiety around the figure of the madman was “because he crosses the frontiers of the bourgeois 
order of his own accord, and alienates himself outside the sacred limit of its ethic” (1965, 58). 
Doctors such as Philippe Pinel and William Tuke developed “moral treatment” and therapy 
centered around labour and proper work ethic, as well as the studies of math and sciences, rather 
than also exercising the imagination through studies of the arts or literature. In connection to the 
Great Confinement, poverty was increasingly viewed as the result of “the weakening of 
discipline and the relaxation of morals” and it was believed that proper work ethic could restore 
reason to afflicted individuals (1965, 58). 
That many populations of the “underclass” were grouped together in the Great 
Confinement is not overlooked by Foucault, and he sees both the medical and legal aspects of 
these structures as falling on a medico-judicial continuum. Though medical and empirical 
explanations of madness claimed to be more humane and to free the mad from an association 
with guilt and criminality, madness maintained an implicit proximity to criminality and was also 
used to justify mass confinement. Whereas in previous eras in France the mad had sometimes 
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been put on display, confinement suggested a shame and a belief that “there are aspects of evil 
that have such a power of contagion, such a force of scandal that any publicity multiplies them 
indefinitely” (1965, 67). The threat of contagion from the mad was seen to be a problem of 
public morality, order, and a decaying influence on society. What Foucault called the “essential 
and most dangerous” madness rose from the poor depths of society and resisted bourgeois 
morality, “acting against the solidity of the family institution and against its most archaic 
symbols” (1965, 267). The moral implications of this is described by Foucault as “a terrible ulcer 
upon the body politic, an ulcer that is wide, deep, and draining, one that cannot be imagined 
except by looking full upon it” (1965, 202). Foucault suggests that ultimately the most dangerous 
madness rose from the lower classes and these dangers were cardinal sins committed against the 
bourgeois society: religious fanaticism, resistance to work, and theft.  
After Madness and Civilization, Foucault's work in the early 1970s on madness directly 
addresses what he would call the apparatus of power itself, or a more micro-level analysis of the 
inner workings of asylums, the role of psychiatrists, and the doctor-patient relationship. In 
Foucault's view, the psychiatrist in the modern asylum from the 19th Century onward would no 
longer operate or justify their power and role based on truth, “but will switch resolutely, 
definitively, to the standpoint of reality” (2006, 132). As the “master of reality” the psychiatrist 
would be able to give Reality enough constraining force or power that madness could disappear 
as madness. The psychiatrist is someone who “must remove from madness its power to avoid 
reality” (2006, 132). The psychiatrist is described as giving a surplus-power to reality, or is 
responsible for the “intensification of reality” (2006, 132). Since psychiatry had constituted itself 
as a medical and clinical science, the question of the truth of madness was no longer at the heart 
of its cure and the question of truth was only posed within psychiatry itself. Psychiatric power is 
defined by Foucault as utilizing two forms of discourse; an “analogan of medical truth” which 
consists of clinical, classifactory, and nosological discourse, and an “anatomical-pathological 
knowledge” which describes the organics correlatives of illness (2006, 133). This psychiatric 
power is defined as first of all being concerned with managing and administering before 
therapeutic intervention. 
Foucault also turned his attention to the agency of patients and their struggle against 
psychiatric power, as well as how psychiatric power had travelled beyond the asylum. One factor 
that showed the gap between the question of truth and actual psychiatric practice was the 
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problem that simulation presented to psychiatric power. Simulation, or the ability to distinguish 
real illness and neurosis from performance or from a madness that simulated madness “was the 
anti-power of the mad confronted with psychiatric power” (2006, 135). The problem of 
simulation is described as “the way in which hysteria simulates hysteria, the way in which a true 
symptom is a certain way of lying and the way in which a false symptom is a way of being truly 
ill” (2006, 135). Hysteria is used as the greatest example of anti-power and also anti-psychiatry 
in action, hysteria was in many ways an asylum-syndrome, or “a syndrome correlative to asylum 
power or medical power” (2006, 137). Foucault claims the performance of hysteria and the 
relationship it created between doctor-patient was not a pathological phenomenon, but a 
phenomenon of struggle within and outside the asylum itself, or a way to force the question of 
truth back onto psychiatry. Within the asylum there was a micro-physics of power between the 
mad person's body and the psychiatrist's body; the psychiatrist was responsible for both 
dominating and absorbing the mad person's body. Foucault describes this relationship between 
doctor-patient as being the subservience to both reality and to the regime of the asylum which 
was made to match the relationships, rules, and functioning of the outside world as much as 
possible. Psychiatric power had also been dispersed throughout other areas of society, and is 
“found wherever it is necessary to make reality function as power” (2006b, 189). The example 
Foucault gives here is how a psychologist will be present in a school when the knowledge the 
school offers ceases to be real to the students and they also need to be directed to back to this 
“reality.” 
The fundamental concern over the dispersal of psychiatric power is related to both the 
disappearance of madness and what Foucault calls “Exteriority.” A short article titled “Madness, 
the Absence of an Oeuvre,” published in 1964 after the first French edition of Madness and 
Civilization, gives clear insight into Foucault's views on what the future of psychiatry and 
conceptions of mental illness would be. In this essay Foucault mentions the major French theatre 
figure Antonin Artaud, who was institutionalized several times and wrote the essay “Van Gogh, 
the Man Suicided by Society” (Van Gogh le suicidé de la société), a defence of Vincent van 
Gogh which claimed that “a madman is also a man whom society did not want to hear and whom 
it wanted to prevent from uttering certain intolerable truths” (1976, 485). Foucault imagines that 
in the future an artistic figure such as Artaud would belong to the “foundation of our language, 
and not to its rupture; neuroses will be placed among the forms that are constitutive of (and not 
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deviant from society)” (2006c). What Foucault describes is the effect of normalization and he 
suggests that in the future what used to be experienced as the limits of strangeness or the 
intolerable would join the society of the “positive.” Madness, which used to denote an “outside,” 
or an Exteriority would be placed in “a pale neutralised space” and effectively cancelled out 
(2006c). Though the actual works of someone like Artaud would be accepted, people would not 
also see themselves in the mad person behind them. The idea that Madness is the absence of an 
oeuvre or work, points not only to one of Foucault's theses in Madness and Civilization that 
madness was associated with the “idle” or seen as the inability to be productive or work, but also 
that a history of madness itself was absent and that madness was a limit or outside that could not 
be adequately captured through language. In questioning why historians had not introduced the 
topics of mental illness and institutionalization into their own areas of study Foucault claimed in 
an interview that it was necessary “for a 'twisted' person to have the bad idea of introducing 
questions at once personal and political” (Friedrich, 1981). The lack of understandings of these 
topics is also related to the stratification of these disciplines, and the continued belief that 
subjective experience cannot constitute a basis for scholarly work.  
In the case of mental illness, Foucault writes that it will become part of a “technical 
substratum” and could either be viewed like any other organic condition, or that perhaps what 
would be accomplished could be the “precise pharmacological control of all psychical 
symptoms” (2006c). The definition of neutralised or depoliticized behavioural constraints and 
modifications would not suppress the development of mental illness, but would simply remove 
madness from culture, and all its subversive connotations along with it. Culture would not be 
distant from madness, but in the distance of madness—or still defining normality in relation to 
what is excluded from a culture, and thus not even fully understood. Overall, Foucault sees that 
while madness and mental illness became confused in the 17th Century they are increasingly 
moving apart linguistically and undoing their belonging to the same phenomenon. Mental illness 
is “set to enter a technical region that is increasingly well controlled: [while] in hospitals, 
pharmacology has already transformed the rooms of the restless into great tepid aquariums” 
(2006c). In contrast, “madness, the lyrical halo of sickness, is ceaselessly dimming its light” 
(2006c). While there are revolutionary changes made possible through Enlightenment thought, 
including combatting ideas of satanic possession or sin causing madness and illness, there is also 
the flip side of the reification of not only a certain conception of what it means to be human, 
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sane, or productive, but how this relates to the ideals of the bourgeois class, which Foucault 
describes in The History of Sexuality.  
To turn focus from mental illness and madness, towards the work of Foucault on the 
subject of Fascism, it is helpful to begin with his understandings of how sexuality was integrated 
into the human sciences to arrive at the concept of bio-politics. Though his History of Sexuality: 
Volume One is concerned with how sexuality became a part of scientific and medical discourse, 
it is also connected to his understanding of the role of psychiatry and psychology. Like some 
would argue health is conceptually formed only in relation to what is first defined as 
pathological, for Foucault, the work of the science of sex was made up of the refusal to speak of 
sex itself and “concerned itself primarily with aberrations, perversions, exceptional oddities, 
pathological abatements, and morbid aggravations” (1980, 53). In Foucault's view, despite the 
neutral standpoint that science adopted, evidently there were “imperatives of a morality whose 
divisions it reiterated under the guise of the medical norm” (1980, 53). Drawing on the history of 
theories of eugenics, degenerationism, and evolutionary theory, Foucault writes about the 
preoccupation with the health of the overall social body along with a changing understanding of 
the role of the state. What he calls the medicine of perversions and programs of eugenics are 
defined as the two great innovations in the technology of sex in the second half of the 19th 
Century. These theories “promised to eliminate defective individuals, degenerate and bastardized 
populations” (1980, 54). To attain a certain social body, both biological and historical 
understandings justified state racism and defined women's bodies as intrinsically pathological, or 
“thoroughly saturated with sexuality” (1980, 104).  
The intensified focus on the body and public health is viewed by Foucault as the self-
affirmation of the bourgeois class. This self-affirmation is described as a technology of power 
and knowledge through which “the bourgeoisie underscored the high political price of its body, 
sensations, and pleasures, its well-being and survival” (1980, 123). While this may have 
involved social control and the political subjugation of other populations, in Foucault's work this 
is described not so much as a “negative” practice, but as an actual program and affirmation of 
self—a way of maximizing life. This focus on the body is seen as a class-based shift from the 
symbolics of blood to the analytics of sex. Whereas the old noble and aristocratic class relied on 
blood to assert the special distinction of their body, the antiquity of their ancestry, and the value 
of their family alliances, the bourgeois class relied on new technologies of sex or a scientia 
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sexualis to assert themselves. Themes from the nobility and their theories of superiority 
resurfaced in the 19th Century bourgeoisie, but in the guise of “biological, medical, or eugenic 
precepts” (1980, 123). This cultivation of health and the body was not simply a tool to maximize 
labour capacity, but represented something much deeper “politically, economically, and 
historically for the present and future of the bourgeoisie” (1980, 125). As previously stated, in 
Foucault's view this preoccupation with health and the social body was not due to just repression 
or restrictive capacity, but was evident of both a changing formation of state and understandings 
of sovereignty.  
What Foucault titles bio-politics and the anatomo-politics of the human body are seen as 
indispensable to the development of capitalism. Bio-politics meant that the highest expression of 
sovereignty and power was no longer to kill, punish, or withhold, but to “invest life through and 
through” (1980, 139). The rapid development of disciplines and institutions such as; universities, 
secondary schools, barracks, and workshops, along with tools measuring birthrates, longevity, 
public health, housing, and migration, all signaled to Foucault the era of bio-politics. Law 
increasingly coalesced around regulatory norms which were incorporated across a spectrum of 
institutions or apparatuses, from the medical to the administrative. A society centered around 
normalization was seen as “the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life” 
(1980, 144). Unlike Fromm's analysis of the psychic interplay between the forces of sadism-
masochism and the development of the authoritarian personality, Foucault does not see Nazism 
or Fascism as a result of repression or the social psychology of a certain class, but as the most 
extreme logic of the bio-political and administrative society. An outcome which is not an 
deviation from modernity. In the History of Sexuality Foucault describes Nazism as containing 
both the old form of the nobility's idea of superiority and the modern disciplinary power of new 
technologies employed by the bourgeoisie. Fascism in Germany contained both a program of 
eugenics and ordering of society based on biological grounds, as well as the exaltation of a 
superior blood and a state racism, though both seem to fit into the exclusion of groups defined as 
“sub-human,” or a biological danger. Similar to the brutal logic of colonialism long practiced 
outside of Europe by the Europeans, whoever is not citizen is subject, but in this case applied 
within Europe itself. In Foucault's view, “it is an irony of history that the Hitlerite politics of sex 
remained an insignificant practice while the blood myth was transformed into the greatest blood 
bath in recent memory” (1980, 150).  
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Materialist Psychiatry and the Social Production of Desire 
In understanding suffering as not just an isolated or individual, but a social phenomenon, 
the concepts created by Deleuze and Guattari offer unique understandings of psychological life 
under capitalism and the persistence of Fascist ideas. As in Fromm and Foucault, there is a clear 
epistemological critique to purely naturalistic understandings of the problem of mental disorder, 
but whereas Foucault employs an genealogical response and Fromm a Marxist Humanist one, 
Deleuze and Guattari put forward a materialist philosophy. Psychoanalysis is also examined 
through their lens of “materialist psychiatry,” and they do so through the idea of the Body 
without Organs, a critique of Freudian ideas, and investigating the concept of Lack. Desire in 
Deleuze and Guattari's work is examined in relation to Fascism, but more broadly desire is 
defined as a productive sphere which is shaped in particular ways for the functioning of 
capitalism. Deleuze and Guattari quote Spinoza to illustrate this Fascist element in the operations 
of desire; “why do men fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation? 
That is, how is it possible that people cry for 'More taxes! Less bread!'?” In questioning how 
people can come to desire their own oppression, Anti-Oedipus disregards the Marxist thesis of 
false consciousness and suggests through the development of a “materialist psychiatry,” that 
psychic forces are not abstractions or externalities, but that “desiring-production is one and the 
same thing as social production” (1977, 28).  Anti-Oedipus responds to both the popularity of 
psychoanalysis, and the continued support on some of the Left for Stalinism, which also 
encompassed social conservatism and hierarchical understandings of “legitimate” political action 
and thought. The chaos of Anti-Oedipus is informed by both this challenging of dominant strands 
of thought and the opening up of possibilities for the psyche.  
Before turning to Anti-Oedipus and its critical contributions, the main definition of 
Fascism in these works will be explored. Guattari's essay “Everybody Wants to be a Fascist,” 
from this time period offers further insight and identifies Fascism as a key theme to use in 
approaching the question of desire in the social realm. Fascist desire is not conceived of as 
something only possible in military dictatorship, but is also explored in relation to Stalinism and 
the model of liberal-capitalist democracy. Fascism is not defined as entrenched in one historical 
context or political regime, but “what fascism set in motion yesterday continues to proliferate in 
other forms, within the complex of contemporary social space” (2009, 163). The term “Fascist 
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desire” indicates that Fascism has a psychic relevance and force and that there is a “fascism of 
the superego in situations of guilt and neurosis” (2009, 163). To this end, as will be seen in Anti-
Oedipus, the anti-fascist struggle is not confined to political action only in the “public” sphere, 
but exists also as a “micropolitical anti-fascist struggle” (2009, 163). Like the other psychical 
forces discussed in Anti-Oedipus, Fascism also has a genealogy and permanence in social 
contexts and relations that goes beyond the historical characterization of Fascism.  
While Guattari does not discount that the historical forms of Fascism in Germany or Italy 
had specific causes he questions how the dominant narratives around the history of the Second 
World War obscure the remaining problem of Fascism. Guattari suggests in the figure of Hitler, 
there were at least “four libidinal series” that crystallized a new desiring machine for the masses, 
or specific components which appealed to different layers of society. These are identified as; the 
populist style which appealed to those marked by socio-democratic and “Bolshevik” strains of 
thinking, the veteran-of-war style which both appealed to and neutralized the military, the 
“shopkeepers opportunism” that led to negotiation with industry and financial magnates—all 
while giving the impression that Hitler could be easily be controlled, and finally, racist delirium. 
The racism in Nazi Germany took the form of a “mad, paranoic energy which put [Hitler] in tune 
with the collective death instinct released from the charnel houses of the First World War” 
(2009, 166). In Guattari's view the narrative of real antagonistic contradictions between the 
Allies and Axis powers and the belief that the alliance of Western democracies and the U.S.S.R. 
formed to “save democracy” is not correct. Guattari writes that while the response of the Allied 
powers was due to the catastrophic realities that Fascism created, it was also in response to “the 
deadly form of libidinal metabolism which developed in the masses as a result of these 
experiments” (2009, 166). The destruction and mass appeal of Fascism was a threat to both 
Capitalism and Stalinism “because the masses invested a fantastic collective death instinct in it” 
(2009, 166). Like Fromm's suggestion that Fascism is the domain of those who revere death and 
have contempt for life, Guattari further claims that “all fascist meanings stem out of a composite 
representation of love and death, or Eros and Thanatos now made into one” (169). The war 
continued even after it was effectively lost and “Hitler and the Nazis were fighting for death,” up 
to and including the death of Germany (2009, 169).  
In the aftermath of this apocalyptic scenario, “the last World War will thus have been the 
opportunity to select the most efficient totalitarian machines, those best adapted to the period” 
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(2009, 169). The optimal selection was the capitalist totalitarian machine, which unlike fascism 
managed to “divide, particularize, and molecularize the workers, meanwhile tapping their 
potentiality for desire” (2009, 169). Capitalism was then able to infiltrate not only the ranks of 
workers, families, the couple, and childhood, but the heart of subjectivity, dreams, and visions of 
the world. Here, the main concern again is returning to the question of subjectivity and 
psychology in relation to capitalism. Capitalism, described by Guattari as a “totalitarian 
machine,” is particularly good at inventing new desires and needs. Everywhere it searches for 
“structures capable of adapting desire to the profit economy” (2009, 170). Fascism and Fascist 
desire is described as a latent phenomenon, something that did not dissipate with the end of the 
war, but is constantly evolving “to the extent that it shares in a micro-political economy of desire 
itself inseparable from the evolution of productive forces” (2009, 171). Fascism may seem to 
come from an external force or the Outside, yet it finds energy “right at the heart of everyone's 
desire” (2009, 171).  
The preface to Anti-Oedipus was written by Michel Foucault and characterizes the work 
as being concerned with the “strategic adversary of Fascism,” and not only historical fascism, but 
“also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour, the fascism that causes us 
to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us” (1977, xiii). In Foucault's 
view, Anti-Oedipus is a book of ethics or the Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life. That the work 
deals with Fascism “whether already present or impending,” and on the level of everyday life, 
suggests that Deleuze and Guattari see Fascism as something that develops out of ingrained 
behaviour, relationships, and patterns of thought, which stem from structures of domination, 
control, and exploitation. Foucault summarizes the main points in the work in a way that is both 
programmatic and deals with aspects of praxis, as well as philosophical, by looking at how 
Deleuze and Guattari's work breaks with the dominant figures of Marx and Freud. This is shown 
when Foucault characterizes the work as pushing back against both the 'sad militants' “who 
would preserve the pure order of politics and political discourse,” and the psychoanalysts, 
described as “poor technicians of desire” (1977, xiii). Political action is seen as something that 
should develop from multiplicity and disjunction, rather than unitary ideas, or subdivisions and 
hierarchies. Foucault suggests that the work invites the reader to “believe what is productive is 
not sedentary but nomadic” (1977, xiii). Or that useful political ideas cannot develop from static 
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dogmas, but have to be understood through experience and questioning the “pure order” of 
politics.  
Anti-Oedipus is described as something that ideally resists the dogmas of the Left at the 
time, and works towards an opening up of the category of the human. It is stated; “do not 
demand of politics that it restore the 'rights' of the individual, as philosophy has defined them. 
The individual is the product of power” (1977, xiii). As is common in many studies of Fascism, 
the work is also concerned with conceptions of power, and Foucault writes that it is a warning to 
“not become enamoured of Power,” and consists of a tracking down of Fascism, “from the 
enormous ones that surround and crush us to the petty ones that constitute the tyrannical 
bitterness of our everyday life” (1977, xiii). In Foucault's view the effect of the Non-Fascist Life 
is the realization that “the flows and productions of desire will simply be viewed as the 
unconscious of the social productions” (1977, xviii). 
Deleuze and Guattari further relate Fascism to their understanding of desire in Anti-
Oedipus when they define two different types of libidinal investments: the paranoiac or 
fascisizing pole and the schizo-revolutionary pole. While the paranoiac element is described as 
an authoritarian type which “counterinvests the periphery” and “invests the formation of central 
sovereignty,” the schizophrenic element is described as a pole following lines of escape of 
desire, which causes flows to move (1977, 276). In Deleuze and Guattari's work the fixed subject 
is one that can only be maintained through social repression. In contrast, the schizophrenic 
subject is described as not believing in the Ego and being far past the problems that the Ego 
brings. Deleuze and Guattari suggest this escape or loss of Ego can have revolutionary 
consequences, “provided one sweeps away the social cover on leaving, or causes a piece of the 
system to get lost in the shuffle” (1977, 277). Foucault's introduction to Anti-Oedipus also 
suggests that “madness is a radical break from power in the form of a disconnection” (1977, 
xxiii). Or that the unfixed subject is a break with social repression and offers new 
understandings. In the system of machines described in Anti-Oedipus, “every machine is a 
machine of a machine” (1977, 36). Therefore, the break from power or from any of these 
machines is still a productive act and leads to productive reassemblies in themselves (1977, 36).  
Deleuze and Guattari's conception of desire forms the basis for their theory of materialist 
psychiatry as “desiring-production is the principal concern of a materialist psychiatry” (1977, 5). 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that their theory of materialist psychiatry has two goals: 
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introducing desire into the social realm and introducing production or economy into desire. 
Deleuze and Guattari claim that production is an immanent principle of desire, meaning desire 
manifests directly in the material world. In this sense, “there is no particular form of existence 
that can be labeled 'psychic reality'” (1977, 22). Rather, “the order of desire is the order of 
production; all production is at once desiring-production and social production” (1977, 296). If 
desire itself is a productive material force and not solely about consumptive practices, “needs are 
derived from desires” (1977, 27). Defining the relationship between consumption and production 
in the work of Deleuze and Guattari relies on spatial theory to help breakdown how production 
and consumption are experienced both socially and individually. Consumption and production 
are not seen as oppositional categories, but the authors claim that “everything is production, 
since the recording processes are immediately consumed, immediately consummated, and these 
consumptions are directly reproduced” (1977, 4). A productive force is defined as “forces that no 
longer permit themselves to be contained in representation, and it calls forth flows and breaks 
that break through representation” (1977, 299). In characterizing this non-linear process of 
production and consumption, Deleuze and Guattari conceive of a complex system of connections 
and flux to explain how desire is connected to the production of reality. 
The process of desire can be interrupted by the Body without Organs (BwO), a concept 
which appears in both Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. The concept of BwO relates to 
both psychiatric power and how Deleuze and Guattari conceive of subjectivity under capitalism. 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest the Classical body is an “organism,” or an organization of bodies 
and desire by patriarchal and medical forces based on “the judgement of God, from which 
medical doctors benefit and on which they base their power” (1987, 159). In Deleuze and 
Guattari’s view, a normative and androcentric understanding of subjectivity or the relationship 
between the mind and the body is exercised through medical authority. In contrast to the 
Classical body and patriarchal conceptions, the BwO is described as a limit “which is continually 
dismantling the organism, causing asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate, 
and attributing to itself subjects that it leaves with nothing more than a name as the trace of an 
intensity” (1987, 4). Like Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari looked to Artaud for inspiration and 
questioned the extent to which psychoanalytic forms of suppression (one example being psychic 
driving) and medical authority may simply reinscribe a normative conception of a unified 
subjectivity, productivity, and Ego that is useful for maintaining and reproducing the status quo. 
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Deleuze and Guattari assert that “where psychoanalysis says, 'Stop, find yourself again,' we 
should say instead, 'let's go further still, we haven't found our BwO yet, we haven't sufficiently 
dismantled ourselves'” (1987, 151). Deleuze and Guattari do not describe this dismantling as 
self-destruction, but see this dismantling as a disarticulation, or “to cease to be an organism” and 
organized on the lines of the Classical body. Like Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari also look to 
recover what is subversive in conceptions of madness and alternative subjectivities.  
This distinction between the BwO and the Classical body also implies a challenge to a 
Liberal conception of subjectivity and this challenge relies on the theory of Affect, described as 
“a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to 
another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body's capacity to act” (1987, xvi). 
Deleuze and Guattari emphasize Spinoza's notion of affectio, where a state is “considered as an 
encounter between the affected body and a second, affecting body” (1987, xvi). Both mental and 
physical bodies are part of this affecting terrain, and the BwO, populated by intensities, is used to 
examine the ways in which psychiatric power readjusts the subject to a normative conception of 
subjectivity and Ego, while closing off new potentialities and experiences. The “judgement of 
God” uproots the immanence of desire, making the body “an organism, a signification, a subject” 
(1987, 159). The stratified and blocked BwO “swings between two poles, the surfaces of 
stratification into which it is recoiled, on which it submits to the judgement, and the plane of 
consistency in which it unfurls and opens to experimentation” (1987, 159).  
The materialist critique of psychoanalysis is also shown in how the concept of Lack is 
questioned as a motivation or the cause of desire. In a materialist philosophy of psychiatry “lack 
is created, planned, and organized in and through social production” (1977, 28). Lack is not 
something that exists prior to desire, but it is a deliberate creation of social and economic forces, 
and “production is never organized based on pre-existing needs or lack” (1977, 28). 
Demystifying lack reinforces Deleuze and Guattari's point that there cannot be a psychic reality 
separate from a social production of reality on another level. Desiring-production and social 
production are both political phenomenon which are enacted materially. Treating belief as 
equivocal to desires misses how people may act against their own interests, desire their own 
oppression, and contradict their own beliefs, principles, and values. Beliefs becomes a main part 
of an already “unproductive unconscious,” rather than seen as having a material basis too (1977, 
61).  
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The criticism of psychiatry in Anti-Oedipus also looks at psychoanalysis through 
Freudian conceptions of desire and the Oedipal complex. Deleuze and Guattari use the figure of 
the schizophrenic as an antagonist to the Freudian project and claim that the Oedipal complex 
presupposes a social investment of a paranoiac type which the schizophrenic refuses, while also 
refusing to be oedipalized. Likewise, “Oedipus presupposes a fantastic repression of desiring-
machines” (1977, 3). Deleuze and Guattari suggest that in the schizophrenic the processes of 
desiring-production and social production are joined together, rather than fragmented. 
Schizophrenia is described as “desiring-production as the limit of social production” (1977, 35). 
The schizophrenic is represented through an excentric circle in contrast to the neurotic triangle of 
the Oedipus. The Oedipal triangle privatizes desire and for Deleuze and Guattari epitomizes the 
social repression of desiring-machines, as desire is described in a specific manner that is the 
creation of the adult world and adult fears, not the child's. The Oedipal triangle is seen as 
constructing desire as something personal, and imaginary so that “production is reduced to mere 
fantasy production” (1977, 55). All productive forces are seen as emanating from the Oedipal 
triangle. Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that in this model of desire a “thousand break-flows of 
desiring-machines—all positive, all productive—are projected into the same mythical space, the 
unitary stroke of the signifier” (1977, 60). 
In using the ideologically fraught concept of the nuclear family to explain desire and 
formation, “Oedipus is always and solely an aggregate of destination fabricated to meet the 
requirements of an aggregate of departure constituted by a social formation” (1977, 101). In this 
aggregate there remains only mother, father, and child, rather than a multiplicity of desire, which 
can be sexual or non-sexual, as libido comprises more than sexual drives. Deleuze and Guattari 
suggest that the reoccurring question of the role of the Father and God in psychoanalysis is born 
of abstraction and assumes “the link to be already broken between man and nature, man and the 
world, so that man must be produced as man by something exterior to nature and to man” (1977, 
107). The corrective and moral authority of the abstraction of Father and God, is what is also 
replicated in the role of the doctor, who is connected to state institutions such as prisons and 
judges. For Deleuze and Guattari, psychoanalysis has constituted “a microcosm symbolizing the 
massive structures of bourgeois society and its values” (1977, 93). The nuclear family is seen as 
a key form for the unconscious psychological repression of the child under capitalism. Rather 
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than emanating from the child's desires or ideas, Deleuze and Guattari again claim that Oedipus 
is first and foremost the idea of an “adult paranoiac” (1977, 274).  
In “Schizoanalysis,” the programmatic response offered to psychoanalysis by material 
psychiatry, the authors claim there are three unavoidable conclusions. First, from the point of 
view of regression, “it is the father who is first in relation to the child” and therefore it is “the 
paranoiac father that oedipalizes the son” (1977, 275). Guilt is created by the father and 
projected onto the child before it is an emotion or inner feeling of the child. Deleuze and Guattari 
also claim that the model of regression encloses the family into a simple reproduction and 
generation cycle. From the view of materialist psychiatry “the family is never determining, but is 
always determined” (1977, 276). The family, particularly the construction of father-mother-child, 
is not a pre-existing social formation apart from economy or culture. Using familial relations as 
the determining factor in psychiatry imposes a predetermined structure as normative and 
undermines the importance of other social relations or production processes. Deleuze and 
Guattari attempt to show that the psychoanalyst is not a neutral figure that simply reveals the 
unconscious through castration and the Oedipal complex and can show the unconscious itself 
without any social context. It is not just the psychoanalyst as an individual who chooses this 
mode of representation, but “the psychoanalyst in us all” (1977, 297). The psychic forces the 
psychoanalyst uncovers and identifies not only have a historic character, but are also socially 
created.  
Comparative Analysis: Humanism and Subjectivity 
In examining the intersections between these author's ideas on psychology, psychiatry, 
and Fascism, there are both commonalities between these analyses and major points of 
contention. Epistemologically, the works of Fromm, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari studied 
here offer a critique to the positivist and naturalist understanding of mental disorder and human 
suffering. Fromm uses a Marxist and Humanist approach to look at the role of Alienation in 
industrial capitalist societies, and also suggests that the divide between the pathological and 
healthy is directly related to the values of a society and that societies themselves can be “sick.” 
Foucault uses a genealogical approach to examine the historical roots and meanings of madness 
and places the increasing medicalization and focus on the body into broader structures of bio-
politics and psychiatric power. Deleuze and Guattari examine the psychic force of desire and 
connect this to social repression and the processes of production and consumption. While all 
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authors are critical of capitalism and motivated to look at the psychological affects of economic 
processes, a commitment to Humanism and the understanding of the subject is a central conflict 
between these works.  
The tension here lies in the desire to affirm a universalist notion of the psyche or human 
nature, and the critical view on how this idea of ‘human nature’ is formed and may eradicate 
difference. Fromm's particular mode of Humanism and understanding of human nature is part of 
a Marxist understanding of emancipation and humanity as a “species-being.” There is a sense of 
a better future that can be achieved when humans are supported to develop to the best of their 
capacities and innate sensibilities. Foucault is critical of Humanism and any essential concept of 
human nature (especially in the context of the Enlightenment) and sees the individual as a 
product of power-relations, revealing how certain subjectivities are pathologized or seen as 
deviant if they do not conform to the view of the individual as a Liberal subject. Deleuze and 
Guattari are also not concerned with affirming Humanism, but are more interested in concept-
formation and developing new language to think of subjectivity and open up possibilities for 
multiple understandings of difference and subjectivity. Foucault's work captures something 
necessary to understandings of normativity in relation to mental disorder and subjectivity that 
Fromm's cannot, while Fromm's affirmation of psyche or the soul of humanity is a necessary tool 
for keeping explorations of social psychology centered on social transformation.  
Health, in Fromm's work is stuck between society's notion of health and an intrinsic ideal 
of health correlated to his conception of human nature. Fromm believes that an individual is 
classified as healthy if they are “able to fulfill the social role he is to take in that given society” 
(1970, 159). Health from the standpoint of society is based on the reproduction of that society, 
the ability to start a family, and to fulfill social necessities. On the individual level, which 
Fromm believes corresponds with human nature, health and normalcy are defined as the 
optimum of growth and happiness of the individual. Most societies promote the individual and 
society-based concept of health with discrepancy between them, and as this distance grows, the 
society grows sicker. People who do not adapt to the sociological concept of health are seen as 
having less value by psychiatrists who do not also analyze the structure of society, and adopt the 
positivist view. The disconnect between the societal and individual understandings of health 
mean that the neurotic person can be healthier and less stunted than the person viewed as more 
normal who may have lost their individuality all together. Health for Fromm then is not a purely 
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ideological construction, but also indicates conditions and material circumstances which allow 
individuals to develop their own better natures. 
Marxism here is part of both a social and individual emancipation. Marxism is defined by 
Fromm as Humanist, as he believes its aim is the full-unfolding of humanity's capacities and 
potentials. Marx saw his contemporary society as one where people had much, but inside were 
little. A key part of Marx's analysis which is often misunderstood, is that he did not just claim 
that the proletariat suffered and was exploited by the capitalist model, but also saw the 
bourgeoisie in acting as the oppressors, as themselves being diminished. The Humanist and 
normative psychology Fromm develops is interested in the divide between having and being, and 
suggests human nature is more concerned with being. Fromm is critical of the materialism and 
consumerism of capitalist society and how this develops new needs, desires, and consciousness 
for people, alienating them from their own nature. Critical psychology is “one critical of man's 
consciousness,” and therefore, new ethical norms and spiritual development is necessary to 
evolve consciousness towards different values, or for social psychology to be orientated towards 
social transformation. Fromm is correct that psychology needs to be socially based and must 
develop a set of ethics, especially in relation to the problem of alienation, but his lack of further 
analysis of normativity and its historical roots provides problems when considering Humanism 
more deeply, and how subjectivity is understood.  
While Foucault's work is not explicitly Feminist theory or philosophy, he is much more 
interested in the idea of difference, looking at dualism, and challenging the Liberal conception of 
Humanism or view that the subject is a unified, rational, and autonomous individual. In the 
works studied here, this is evident in his discussion on hysteria and how he conceives of 
resistance to psychiatric-power. In Foucault's Madness and Civilization he discusses how 
“nervous disorders” and hysteric symptoms were classified in relation to a specific understanding 
of subjectivity. Diseases of the nerves were seen as diseases of sympathy and women's bodies 
were viewed as enclosing a “perpetual possibility of hysteria” (1965, 154). Women could fall ill 
from perpetual feeling and sympathy. These “diseases of the nerves are diseases of corporeal 
continuity” (1965, 154). Or in other words, a subjectivity that is also formed through relations 
with others and so cannot be unified and static. The hysterization of women's bodies is 
considered a key development in the technologies of sex that Foucault describes, where women 
were coded as “throughly saturated with sexuality,” and women's bodies were given an intrinsic 
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pathology, especially in relation to reproduction and family life. In Foucault's discussion of how 
hysteria operated within asylums he attempts to show that the relationship between patient and 
doctor is not just one between the powerful and the powerless, or a victim and victimizer, but 
that the patients also impacted how diagnoses were formed and symptoms “captured.” This 
agency is shown through discussions of simulation and how psychiatric power was evaded by the 
question of truth that simulation brought back onto the doctor. This is what Foucault called the 
“anti-power” of the mad and Foucault saw simulation and the performance of hysteria as a 
phenomenon of struggle within the asylum itself.  
While Fromm looks at normativity in relation to either the distinction between social and 
individual views of health, and suggests there are normative ethics which conform to humanity's 
essential nature, Foucault investigates how normativity more broadly relates to understandings of 
subjectivity. Normativity is not seen in just the demarcation between the pathological and 
healthy, but is foundational to a conditional subjectivity that everyone is expected to embody, 
despite the vast differences between people's experience of the world and self-knowledge. Where 
this becomes further problematized is when this subject is conflated with humanity or human 
nature, giving license to exclude or dehumanize anyone who does not share this experience of 
the world. Certainly, this point applies theoretically to feminist and anti-colonial critiques of 
humanism, whether these groups resisted Humanism all together or aimed to develop the new 
“Human.” In relation to the history of psychiatry this point connects to how pathologization has 
frequently coincided with labelling or restraining those who act “above” the station society has 
granted them, and fully embody their experience of the world. Whether it is called subversion, 
deviance, or “anti-power,” the importance of affirming this history is what Fromm misses in his 
development of the idea of normativity and that this agency is seen in the work of Foucault is 
one thing that continues to make his work resonate today.  
While Deleuze and Guattari fall alongside Foucault in questioning the dominant 
subjectivity that Humanism is coalesced around, their philosophy is less interested in critique and 
instead focused on producing new concepts and language. In offering a “materialist psychiatry” 
Deleuze and Guattari, like Fromm, are also searching for an ethical framework that psychology 
and psychiatry could exist under. While Deleuze and Guattari's analysis is more in contention 
with Marxism than Fromm's, they are also concerned with praxis. This is even noted by Foucault 
when he suggests that Anti-Oedipus is surprisingly and maybe to the dismay of its authors, a 
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book of ethics. Materialist psychiatry is aimed at identifying desire in the social realm and seeing 
psychic forces as connecting to the economic processes of both production and consumption. 
Since “there is no particular form of existence that can be labeled 'psychic reality.'” Deleuze and 
Guattari make a point to explain how an individual may articulate one set of principles and 
beliefs, but act in contradiction to those beliefs. Their explanation of how individuals may come 
to desire their own repression is critical of the Marxist notion of false consciousness and the 
Humanist ideal of an essentially rationally motivated, unified, and organized subject. The 
concept of the Body without Organs and “desiring-production” are all ways in Anti-Oedipus 
through which Deleuze and Guattari attempt to provide alternative ways for thinking about 
subjectivity. While A Thousand Plateaus is even more rife with conceptual creations like; 
multiplicity, rhizome, plateaus, and assemblages.  
Another factor which explains why Deleuze and Guattari rely on a more “affirmative” 
program and the development of an ethics to discuss the connections between psychiatry, 
psychology, and politics is their wish to avoid representational thought and affirm materialism. 
In arguing against the reproduction of representational thought, Deleuze and Guattari claim that; 
“the question is not: is it true? But: does it work?” (1987, xvi). Meaning more so if the work is 
helpful for developing alternatives ways of living, rather than does it correspond with a direct 
representation of reality. The philosophy in the Capitalism and Schizophrenia series is part of a 
more broader criticism of Western philosophy for relating “expressions and actions to exterior or 
transcendent ends, instead of evaluating them on a plane of consistency on the basis of their 
intrinsic value” (1987, 22). Representational thought is viewed as “State philosophy,” and 
“analogical; its concern is to establish a correspondence between these symmetrically structured 
domain” (1987, 22). State philosophy, according to Deleuze and Guattari “has never reached an 
understanding of multiplicity” and produces a dichotomous and binary logic, built on a strong 
principle of unity (1987, 5). So, while Deleuze and Guattari are also opposed to the Humanist 
view of a fixed human nature that Fromm endorses, they are also engaged with ethics and 
attempting to provide frameworks for understanding the psyche as a social concept and for this 
transformation to be emancipatory, which is much less evident in Foucault's analysis. 
In returning to the historical approach of the works under study, Fascism is relevant to 
both the Post-war context these authors are writing in and the concern with psychology that 
informs their theoretical basis. In all cases, Fascism is related to class, critiques of capitalism or 
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structures of power, and not defined through the lens of Historical Fascism. Fascism is seen as 
something that is not just related to one set of economic circumstances or crisis, but also has a 
basis in subjectivity. The problem in applying these analyses to the contemporary rise in Fascist 
or Neo-Nazi groups will lie in the divide between Historical Fascism and Fascism defined as a 
response to more general psychic and economic forces. For Fromm, the rise of Fascism was 
related to a “social character” of a particular class and the development of the authoritarian 
personality. The social character Fromm describes is most relevant to Historical Fascism in 
Germany. However, Fromm's description of individual alienation and the revanchism that these 
destructive identifications often follow, also seems to have contemporary relevance. In 
Foucault's writings Fascism is not an anomaly in the history of liberal democracy, but is 
connected to the new social body formed in the image of the bourgeois class, technologies of 
sex, and the advent of the administrative bio-political society. Foucault acknowledged that these 
technologies were transient and would change overtime, but the bio-political control of 
populations is also still seen in claims to the racial “purity” of the social body. In Deleuze and 
Guattari, Fascism has a historical form that was particular to certain conditions at the time, but is 
also a latent force which continues to operate in the totalitarian capitalist system. While there is 
merit to a historical analysis in more specific contexts, the reappearance of this problem under 
very different circumstances also reiterates the point that Fascist ideologies have wider 
significance than was once thought.  
In Fromm's view the social subjectivity of Fascism in Germany was related to the need 
for a class which had been displaced, or lost previous economic privileges, to reaffirm their 
identity through a powerful authoritarian force. In the transition to a more individualistic model 
of society, individual powerlessness, alienation, and isolation made these identifications more 
likely to have a destructive basis as “destructiveness is the outcome of an unlived life” (1970, 
207). Since the time Fromm is writing in, the power to make economic changes and decisions by 
democratic elections in individual states has also been increasingly delinked from the nation-
state model to international bodies and capital, making this perhaps a new instance of 
powerlessness for the average person, and arena in which social bonds are displaced and there is 
an anxiety to reaffirm them. Globalization has promoted the free flow of goods, while the flow of 
people has come up against borders which have become more stratified, divided, and militarized. 
Destructive and Fascist identifications, especially on ethnic lines, have followed the model of 
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concerns over citizenship that Támas outlined in his theory of “Post-Fascism.” For Fascism to 
have a social base, there is no longer the need for formal dictatorship or military control as “post-
totalitarian Fascism is thriving under the capacious carapace of global capitalism” (2000). While 
the specific “social character” Fromm describes in relation to Germany is a historical one, the 
sense of reactivity to a perceived loss in privilege in the middle classes is relevant for describing 
Fascist resurgence today. White Nationalist and Nazi groups affirm a White-only conception of 
citizenship and as Támas describes, also fall along the lines of reversing the Enlightenment 
project of inclusion into the concept of citizenship and socially excluding others to the point of 
“their natural exclusion (i.e., extra-legal arrests, hunger, and death)” (2000). Yet, as Támas 
writes, the linking of citizenship to the height of humanity is not a Fascist invention, but a larger 
contradiction and problem within liberal democracy itself.  
In Foucault's view, the most racist societies were also likely to be the most violent and 
destructive. Foucault analyzes Fascism as being based on both the nobility's claim to “blood” as 
justifying their ruling superiority and the bourgeois classes' production and solidification of their 
own body through technologies of sex. Even prior to the Fascist era in Germany, the Weimar 
Republic practiced a eugenic ordering of society, and Fascism extended and intensified these 
micro-powers while the “blood myth was transformed into the greatest blood bath in recent 
memory” (1980, 150). While the transient technologies Foucault described have certainly 
changed, the belief in the protection of the social body and discourses around birthrates and the 
fear of the disappearance of the “white race” seem to be relevant to the technologies of sex he 
outlines in History of Sexuality. This analysis could also relate and be applied to Fascist 
ideologies around gender and the reaffirmation of women as only being socially relevant in the 
role of mothers and caregivers. Like Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault also cautions against the 
“fascist in us all,” suggesting that these destructive drives have a wider relevance in relation to 
economic forces and organization. 
In Deleuze and Guattari's analysis Fascism should not be the “historian's speciality;” but 
what the Fascist experience set forward continued to proliferate in other spheres. Therefore, it 
was not enough to just politically identify as “anti-Fascist” or link Fascism to one historical 
circumstance that had been defeated by the forces of democracy. Fascism also took place on a 
micro-political level, involved other social institutions, and the continuation of hierarchies, 
exploitation, and domination on all levels. The Non-Fascist life in this case involves the more 
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difficult task of everyday life and interpersonal relationships. New ethical frameworks needed to 
be created. Fascism could be not be dismissed as a phenomenon “outside” or “over there,” but 
had to be seen as only possible through socially produced desire that found its energy “right at 
the heart of everyone's desire” (2009, 171). What was totalitarian about capitalism in this 
instance was that it would continue to search out for proper structures and “structures capable of 
adapting desire to the profit economy,” and whether these structures reinforced Fascist-desire 
had no bearing on their operations (2009, 171).  
New Developments: The Control Society and Psycho-politics 
Given that each analysis studied is related to evolving economic and technological 
circumstances and how psychic forces form and interact with them, new developments should be 
examined to further relate how the intersections of psychology, psychiatry, and Fascism can be 
understood today. Mental illness has also increased to what some would consider “crisis” levels 
and as seen in the statistics relayed earlier, is a more common and growing occurrence. Another 
issue in applying the epistemological insights from these authors is that technologies such as big 
data and algorithms have evolved to make quantification and positivist applications more 
commonplace in all levels of society, as well as to operate on a more profound level than what 
mere statistical analysis can capture. Related new developments will be explored through 
Deleuze's essay “Postscript on the Societies of Control” (1992) which builds off of Foucault's 
previous analysis of disciplinary societies and attempts to describe how new institutions and 
modes of control are emerging. Another relevant author to discuss in updating the context of 
these analyses is the philosopher Byung Chul-Han whose recent works The Burnout Society 
(2015) and Psycho-Politics (2017) build on both Foucault and Deleuze to analyze the new 
technologies of Neoliberalism in relation to mental health outcomes. Han's analysis offers insight 
in describing social subjectivity under Neoliberalism, but his work under-analyzes the structural 
causes of these symptoms. The technologies Han describes are new modes of capitalist 
accumulation and suggesting that these transformations result in an “auto-exploitation” which 
obliterates and internalizes the Master-Slave dialectic, obscures any useful understanding of class 
in the basis of these technologies. While it is clear that an increase in precarity, competition, and 
the downloading of social to individual responsibility may lead to the “achievement-subject” 
Han describes, it is also undefined in Han's work at which point some of the exhaustion and 
burnout he describes acts also a refusal to the compulsion of constant productivity or amounts to 
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Fromm's suggestion that the adaptability of human beings always has its limits, and either a 
constructive or destructive disobedience will arise.  
In the essay “Postscript on the Societies of Control” Deleuze describes facets of what 
might be recognized to be typical characteristics of Neoliberalism today, but the essay is 
centered on describing a broader crisis in the transformation of institutions from the disciplinary 
society to the control society. Issues that relate to the relationship between the psyche and 
economic processes mentioned in this essay include: a change in the economy of attention and 
cognitive functioning to a more fragmented level, an increase in debt-based economics, an 
increase in competition, as well as the belief in “meritocracy,” or merit-based salary. In 
Deleuze's view the disciplinary society from the 18th and 19th Centuries reached its heights in the 
20th Century and post-Second World War transitioned to a society centered on control, rather 
than discipline. The disciplinary society was based on the “organization of vast spaces of 
enclosures,” and the individual could only pass from one enclosed space to another (1992, 3). As 
Foucault states in History of Sexuality this society is predicated on a bio-politics aimed at 
administering and organizing life, rather than a sovereign power based on the threat of death or 
exclusion. The disciplinary society included institutions such as hospitals, school, the factory, 
and family, but the prison was the analogical model and the main aim of the environment of 
enclosures was “to concentrate, to distribute in space; to order in time; to compose a productive 
force within the dimension of space-time whose effect will be greater than the sum of all its 
component forces” (1992, 3).  
The conception of space changed from the disciplinary society's differentiated enclosed 
spaces that an individual could walk through from one to the other, as independent variables, to 
mechanisms of control and space that acted as inseparable variables. In the control society 
Deleuze describes this power as operating as “free-floating control” (1992, 4). An example 
Deleuze gives being that the enclosure of the school is replaced with perpetual and ongoing 
training. Instead of the prison as the main analogous-model the control society is an analogy to 
the corporation “and the corporation is a spirit, a gas” (1992, 4). Power is described as both less 
tangible and identifiable, but more all encompassing. The corporation is a “metastability” that 
presents the brashest rivalry as a motivating force and “a healthy form of emulation” (1992, 5). 
Individuals are increasingly pitted against one another “dividing each within” and one is never 
finished with anything productivity-wise (1992, 5). Attention and how one focused their 
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cognitive energies became fragmented, while economic precarity increased. In the disciplinary 
society there were two distinct and separate poles, that of the individual and the mass, in which a 
number of an administrative numeration would indicate their position within a mass. In the 
control society this shifted to where “power individualizes and masses together, that is, 
constitutes those over whom it exercises power into a body and molds the individuality of each 
member of that body” (1992, 5).  
In terms of technological changes, Deleuze writes that increasingly individuals have 
become represented as quantified data. They were increasingly “dividuals” rather than 
individuals and could be used to represent masses, samples, data, markets, or “banks.” Deleuze 
also describes the impact of Neoliberal economics and outsourcing of production with the “soul” 
of the corporation changing from concrete production to marketing. In this economic system the 
subject of control is in constant network, flux, and orbit. Under the deluge of financialization 
“even art has left the spaces of enclosure in order to enter into the open circuits of the bank” 
(1992, 6). The transition to the control society is also marked by an increase in debt, and 
indebtedness being tied to subjectivity. Deleuze returns to the question of how ideas of health 
and the social body changed from the disciplinary society to the control society and writes that 
there will be a “new medicine” that singles out potential sick people and subjects at risk “which 
in no way attests to individuation—as they say—but substitutes for the individual or numerical 
body the code of a 'dividual' material to be controlled” (1992, 7).  
In Han's Burnout Society (2015) the transition from the disciplinary to the control society 
is not as strongly connected as in the work of Deleuze to particular structural and economic 
changes, but describes a general affective shift in psychic forces caused by the increased 
deployment of emotions in a kind of “affective” capitalism. In Han's view both the control and 
disciplinary society are still effectively based on the “negative” or governed by “no.” In contrast, 
contemporary neoliberal society operates on positivity and the “violence of positivity does not 
deprive, it saturates; it does not exclude, it exhausts” (2015, 7). This excess of positivity is 
described alongside excessive stimuli, information, impulses, and a fragmented economy of 
attention, and “the society of achievement and activeness is generating excessive tiredness and 
exhaustion” (Han, 2015, 31). However, in following Foucault's work, the disciplinary model is 
already moving away from a sovereign power based on the threat of exclusionary measures, and 
so is already “positive.” Though the desire to maximize production continues to act as the social 
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unconscious, the invocation has changed from what others “should” do, to what they “can” do. 
Han suggests that the epidemic of burnout, exhaustion, and depression are the results of a burned 
out soul which is constantly being pressured to achieve, belong, and continually become oneself. 
Han's analysis in Pyscho-Politics (2017) suggests that capitalism more frequently relies on 
techniques of emotional and affective capture and control. Neoliberalism deploys emotions as 
“resources in order to bring about heightened productivity and achievement” (2017, 45). 
Foucault's notion of Bio-politics is used to describe the governmental technology of disciplinary 
power, but somehow this is still described as power based on negative measures, while the 
control Deleuze recounts is instead aimed at the psyche and constitutes a kind of “psycho-
politics.”  
That people in this state of Neoliberal competition become “divided within” as Deleuze 
claims is echoed in Han's conceptualization of the “achievement subject” which is described as 
having internalized the master-slave dialectic. Yet, whereas Deleuze clearly sets the groundwork 
for institutional change and the shift to neoliberal and financial capitalism in how he 
contextualizes people in a growing state of flux or orbit, Han's analysis seems to inadvertently 
individualize these problems when he suggests that, “the depressive human being is an animal 
laborans that exploits itself—and it does so voluntarily, without external constraints” (2015, 10). 
The epidemic of psychic maladies such as depression and burnout are seen by Han as 
representing “pathological signs that freedom is now switching over into manifold forms of 
compulsion” (2017, 2). What exactly this prior freedom is that has been eroded by the excess of 
“positivity” into compulsion is undefined, but it may be the awareness of exploitation itself. It is 
clear that the logic of free exchange or freedom to enter into agreement provides little substance 
for understanding the context these agreements take place in or their outcomes, i.e. self-
exploitation. For Han, the compulsion to exploit one's self or auto-exploitation, suggests “people 
are turning their aggression against themselves” (2017, 6).  
An example which can offer insight into both Han's “psycho-politics” and the conceptual 
problem that the abstract idea of “self-exploitation” represents is the recent Cambridge Analytica 
scandal, where it was discovered that tens of millions of Facebook user's data was obtained by a 
private third-party working with the Trump campaign on its election strategy. While it can be 
argued that the technologies of big-data and social media more specifically are used willingly by 
users who agree to certain terms and conditions, for work, self-promotion, leisure, and social 
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connectivity, the uses of user-generated data for private profit and political purposes suggests 
that this data-mining of the “soul” or intensive psycho-graphics is not driven by individual “auto-
exploitation,” but is a clear example of capitalist accumulation in a new realm. To suggest users 
drop out from these platforms as solutions, use analogue technology, or to romantically advocate 
as Han does to “returning to the inner animal, which doesn’t consume or communicate 
unfortunately” ignores the structural problem of democratic control of these technologies and 
does not guarantee a transformation in mental health outcomes (Geli, 2018). Here politics is not 
only resting on the basis of psycho-graphics and the intensive harvesting of voters deepest hopes 
and fear, but this positivist application imagines the complexities of these voters as mere 
“mathematical outputs” and psychological vulnerabilities to be exploited (Chen, 2018).  
If as Han claims “auto-aggressivity means that the exploited are not inclined to revolution 
so much as depression” it is also worth considering the political ramifications of mass burnout 
and exhaustion (2017, 6). Han's description suggests there is level of self-unawareness in this 
self-exploitation. In Fromm's discussion of the adaptability of human beings, he suggests that 
almost anything can be done to human beings “yet, only almost.” Fromm writes that, “despots 
and ruling cliques can succeed in dominating and exploiting their fellow man, but they cannot 
prevent reaction to this inhuman treatment” (1967, 26). Response to this domination either takes 
a creative and productive disobedience in attempting to change this system, or a destructive form 
in people simply becoming exhausted and perishing. Might it be more useful to think of the 
symptoms Han describes as not the “destruction of the human soul,” but more what Fromm 
classifies as disobedience, albeit in a reactive and self-destructive form? In this way Han's 
category of compulsive and abstract “self-exploitation,” like the model of bio-medical 
application, removes the individual from the social body and seems to also obscure a structural 
understanding of the new technologies he describes.  
While Han discusses the increased deployment of affects and emotions in capitalism, he 
does not clarify the role of emotions or desire as a social force in politics, or where this 
destructive “burnout” can lead besides self-exploitation. Or how this burnout can coalesce into 
social destruction. It is clear that Fascist movements also respond to and manipulate fears and 
frustrations by uniting people under the guise of national or racial superiority, while practically 
further creating divisions between people, neutralizing the working class and alternative political 
forces, and scapegoating the most marginalized communities as somehow responsible. The 
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widespread exploitation of fears and frustrations needs to be responded to with a sustained 
understanding of the powerlessness, alienation, and disempowerment many people feel. As has 
been shown in this work, some examples which offer insight might be the Marxist approach to 
Alienation Fromm describes in motivating the social identifications with something larger and 
destructive, or Deleuze and Guattari's suggestions that Fascism is a socially produced desire, so 
that these problems are not displaced and simply called the ignorance of some others. Fascism 
still remains a structural possibility under capitalism in response to economic and psychological 
crisis and to ignore this possibility would be more even more destructive.  
Conclusion: Towards a Sane Society? 
Regardless of technological changes and a shifting economic model, on an 
epistemological level, the critiques Fromm, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari make about 
explanations of mental disorder from a positivist standpoint remain even more relevant today. In 
shifting from bio-politics to a much more technologically advanced capitalism that increasingly 
deploys emotional and affective methods, the “belief that life admits measurement and 
quantification governs the digital age as a whole” (Han, 2017, 60). While Big Data “opens up the 
prospect of absolute knowledge” this data-driven quantification of all of reality “is driving Spirit 
from the realm of knowledge” (Han, 2017, 68). Spirit is driven from the realm of knowledge and 
as seen in the history of psychology the concept of psyche is emptied of its content of soul, 
becoming just another measurement for mental performance and productivity. Despite these 
technological advancements, it remains true that “sensation is the enemy of quantification. There 
is no machine, yet, to which a nervous system can submit to transform into a sufficiently 
descriptive measurement” (Boyer, 2015). That being said, the problem remains with what to do 
with suffering once it is freed from the strictly medical realm. The point of this philosophical 
investigation has not been to advocate for the view of “anti” anything, or to follow the theoretical 
threads of an “anti-psychiatry,” i.e. suggest people forgo all psychotropic medication and 
medical interventions, or to deny the life-saving value these responses do have in some 
circumstances. The aim in freeing mental suffering from the strictly medical realm is to address 
the social functions of illness and see suffering as also a social phenomenon. Despite the 
pretensions of an objective scientific paradigm the bio-medical model, it is not free from the 
workings of larger social and economic models or from making morally grounded claims on how 
people ‘ought’ to behave.  
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Another issue which arises today that has changed the landscape of these fields of studies 
is the increase in diagnostic categories and medical language which often sanitizes how we talk 
about violence. An example where medicalization has operated in the sanitization of language 
and the 'dividual' mode Deleuze describes, is the concept of trauma. The diagnostic of trauma is 
an interesting example for both the ways it has evolved from its initial conception to the broad 
personal and social experiences it now describes. The etymology of trauma literally translates as 
“wound” and prior to the 19th Century, in a medical context, trauma referred to actual physical 
blows ex. blunt force trauma. The term began to be psychologized through neurologists such as 
Jean-Martin Charcot and his diagnosis of “traumatic hysteria,” and the German neurologist Paul 
Oppenheim's diagnosis of “traumatic neurosis.” In a contemporary North American context, 
psychic trauma became a diagnosis in the third edition of the DSM in 1980 with the condition of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). PTSD is historically linked to the experiences of war 
veterans and soldiers, drawing on the previous category of “shell shock” that was experienced 
during the First World War with the introduction of heavy artillery. Symptoms experienced by 
survivors of sexual violence, domestic abuse, and instances of political and state violence (such 
as imprisonment or torture), were also integrated under the PTSD umbrella.  
While this medical diagnosis validates a range of human suffering, it also conflates 
widely different categories of experience all under the idea of a psychic woundedness which 
seems to also repress and disassociate our awareness away from horrible events. From an 
epistemological standpoint, Trauma theory addresses and identifies the newly traumatized 
subject as experiencing the break between the previous promise and potential of the world with 
the new post-trauma reality of the world (Freedman, 2006). The subject not only undergoes a 
shattering of the self, but a shattering of the world and the “subject of trauma theory is 
characterized by that which it does not know/remember” (Radstone, 2007, 20). Present in this 
wide application of trauma to so many different experiences is the problem of epistemic 
legitimacy. Traumatically informed subjects are depicted as irrational and developing their 
claims based on experiences that are clouded by fear and emotion, and therefore lack legitimacy 
(Freedman, 2006). The experience of a social wrong or violence may generate trauma, but 
continually codifying such wide referents of systemic problems into a generalized medical 
experience, seems to present both an ethical problem and to promote the epistemic erasure of 
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what these accounts can say about the reality of violent events which are often publicly 
repressed.  
The trouble remains with what to formulate as a philosophical and programmatic 
response to both the prior insights gained from this study of Fromm, Foucault, and Deleuze and 
Guattari and the changes in terms of technology and economy, as well as the increased reliance 
on the bio-medical model and sanitized language, which also makes psychoanalysis much less of 
an issue in critique of the dominant model. If, as Foucault claimed the “margin is a myth” 
madness no longer has a reference to an alterity and autonomous response of the subject, but the 
large increase in more common illnesses such as anxiety, depression, and addiction also suggests 
that these responses do encompass a refusal and disobedience of their own, even if it is not a 
constructive one. This also aligns with Pelbart's description of bio-politics and the state of bodies 
today as those which simply cannot take “anymore of that which coerces, from the outside and 
from the inside” (2015, 33). It is undeniable that the mass epidemic of mental illness has roots in 
larger social and economic problems, but this also needs to be connected to a programmatic 
response. As, in the long run “healing depression with artificial euphorization cannot work and 
sooner or later the depressed organism will collapse” (2016, Berardi).  
In examining the uses of these works today critical analysis is necessary, but concept-
formation in the realm of political philosophy and theory and finding productive ways to talk 
about the relationship between psychic and economic forces is also key. Social change cannot 
occur without emotional investment, and as previously stated, taking emotions seriously in the 
formulation of a political program does not have to mean the manipulation of fears or 
frustrations that accompanies Fascist and far-right movements. Fromm's use of social 
psychology and keeping the soul in psyche seem necessary for anyone interested in social 
transformation and addressing the root causes of growing rates of depression, anxiety, addiction, 
and other mental disorders. While the Marxist critique of capitalism and Alienation as its 
psycho-pathological counterpart remains the most relevant way to understand the shifting 
relationship between subjectivity and economic forces. Through the study of Deleuze and 
Guattari it is evident that sometimes the most thoughtful response is not “is it true,” but does it 
work? This is also prescient when the goal is to address the mental health epidemic on a long 
term and future-oriented basis, rather than search for quick-fix solutions that do not address 
socio-political circumstances that enable this epidemic. In looking at the uses of Foucault there is 
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both the analysis of psychiatric power which shows how medicalization disperses into other 
levels of society and the genealogical analysis of the absence of Madness’ “oeuvre” which 
continues to make more research on this topic necessary. As Fromm suggests, in not looking 
critically at the “sanity” of a culture itself; “we look at them as strictly individual incidents, 
perhaps with some amazement that so many of these incidents should occur in a culture which is 
supposedly so sane” (1967, 13). In putting the social back in the economy and the soul back in 
the psyche, ideally we come to recognize that this epidemic does not need to be the “new 
normal” and is not reflective of a very “sane society.” Rather, in finding creative and productive 
responses of disobedience we can see as Oscar Wilde writes that; “pain is not the ultimate mode 
of perfection. It is merely provisional and a protest. It has reference to wrong, unhealthy, unjust 
surroundings. When the wrong, and the disease, and the injustice are removed, it will have no 
further place.”  
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